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Nietzsche is not considered to be a methodologist. (1) To talk 
about his method almost seems a contradiction in terms. In our 
days, when his popularity is again at its height, there is a lot o f 
talk about his style, among other things, but no discussion of his 
"method". (2) And yet, one of the most influential thinkers o f our 
age, Michel Foucault has read and used Nietzsche just in this way, 
as an inventor of a new method: genealogy. (3)
There is another thinker, widely credited to be an important 
methodologist in the social sciences, whose links to Nietzsche have 
just recently received increased attention: Max Weber. While for 
decades, Nietzsche's name did not even appear in the subject 
indexes o f monographs on Weber, recently he has been 
acknowledged as a major source. (4) We may take this idea a step 
further by stating that this influence was most significant at the 
level o f method: that Weber read Nietzsche in the same way as 
more than half a century7 later, and independently o f him, did 
Foucault. There are strong indications that in his last years, 
Foucault realised that in Weber, he had predecessor in using 
Nietzsche. (5)
Due to the huge resonance o f Foucault’s work, the term 
"genealogy" gained recently currency7 in certain types o f analyses. 
Yet, there is a considerable confusion in its exact meaning. This is 
in no small way due to the manner in which Foucault used this 
term, especially in his writings o f the 1970's. This was the period 
where Foucault's name became known all over the world, when he 
wrote those two books that are still most associated with his 
name, especially7 but not exclusively in the broad field of the social 
and political sciences. (6) Yet, as a careful analysis could show in 
detail, this was the period when, due to a number o f reasons, his 
work was the most confused and questionable. (7). Unfortunately, 
by taking at face value some o f his own claims, Foucault's least 
Nietzschean period was declared to be the most Nietzschean one, 




























































































This may explain the fact that in spite o f the wide reference to 
Foucault's work, the links to Nietzsche were not much studied in 
detail. Most of those who used Foucault were situated in the left of 
the political spectrum where Nietzsche was not much referred to 
before, (8) and possibly assumed that whatever was o f value in 
Nietzsche to their purposes, Foucault exhausted in his work of the 
1970's. Therefore, it would be a meaningless exercise in exegesis 
to go back to the original texts. Symptomatically, in their standard 
work on Foucault, Dreyfus and Rabinow simply declined any 
interest in entering the labyrinth o f Nietzsche scholarship. (9) 
Even in the few works that tried to go back to Nietzsche, 
methodological interest was minimal. (10)
The aim of this paper is to tackle questions about the genealogical 
method explicitly, to sort out some o f the confusion still 
surrounding this concept. It argues that, quite faithfully to the 
spirit o f the method, this can only be done if careful attention is 
paid to its own conditions o f emergence. Now, it seems that 
Nietzsche has never used the term "genealogy" until the moment 
that it appeared in the title o f one of his books. (11)
The Genealogy o f Morals represents the culmination o f Nietzsche's 
work, in a number o f different senses. First, it is generally 
acknowledged as his chef d'oeuvre , the most coherent exposition 
o f his key ideas. Second, it is not just more systematic than his 
other books, written in the form o f aphorisms, but presents a new 
method: genealogy. Finally, it is a culmination of the previous 
work also in the sense o f cumulativity. It builds upon and 
therefore assumes knowledge o f all his previous works. Nietzsche 
spells this out explicitly, claiming that it may not be possible to 
understand this book without an acquaintance with the previous 
ones. (12)
There is nothing new or controversial in these three points. They 
are in line with most o f the acknowledged wisdom of Nietzsche 
scholarship. (13) But this paper will not present another 
summary or commentary. It has a specific aim. It wants to show 




























































































Nietzsche wrote in 1886-87 for the second editions of some o f his 
earlier books, and that such a reading is crucial for the 
understanding of both the book, and of the genealogical method. 
(14)
Such a reading can be justified by simple chronological grounds. 
The writing and publication o f the Genealogy directly followed 
upon that o f the Prefaces. (15) As Nietzsche has always 
painstakingly worked on his previous ideas, the exact 
chronological order o f his thinking is o f much importance. 
Different commentators did in fact lay an emphasis on the exact 
dating o f his different notes, so it is quite surprising that not much 
attempt was made so far in reading the Prefaces together. (16) 
There may be two reasons for this omission that together form a 
tight web. First, in standard editions of Nietzsche these Prefaces 
are not bound together. Even in the Colli-Montinari edition, they 
found their natural place together with the books to which they 
written. But this would not have been sufficient without a second 
reason, which was a lack o f interest in them. So long as such post­
fact accounts were considered merely as ad hoc justifications by 
the author o f his former work, they did not evoke much attention.
However, this paper will present a different perspective on the 
writing o f late Prefaces. It will argue that the Genealogy is the 
corollary o f the writing o f these Prefaces. In one language, one can 
say that these two sets o f works are interdependent, assume the 
knowledge o f each other. Using a slightly different language one 
can state that the exercise Nietzsche did on his former works 
when writing the Prefaces, this work on the self by the self, had a 
significant substantive and methodological effect: this effect was 
the writing o f the Genealogy o f Morals , and the discovery o f the 
genealogical method.
Such an analysis may also bring us closer to solving some o f the 
riddles o f Nietzsche's work. Let's mention only one o f them: the 
peculiar title. First, the book is supposedly about morals. This, in 
itself, is a quite huge topic for a small volume. And yet, morality is 




























































































the question of values in general. Apart from the definition of the 
topic, the manner o f analysis is also elusive. The book is not a 
treatment in moral philosophy, but neither is its criticism. It is a 
"genealogical" analysis, as the other key word of the title indicates. 
But this presents immediate problems on its own. The term 
"genealogy" has a very specific meaning, the reconstruction and 
analysis o f family lineage. It smells obsolescence and irrelevance, 
a kind o f analysis that seems to be the least suitable for the study 
of modern society. Its application to morals, moreover, seems to 
be a contradiction in term. In fact, one could say that morality can 
even be defined as the break with a type o f customary order that 
is located in family lineage. (17) Finally, the title begins with the 
term "on", suggesting incompleteness, even accidentally; the 
casualness o f the approach that is reinforced by the closing part of 
section eight o f the Preface , (18) but that is belied by the tight 
structure and the strong methodological orientation o f the whole 
book.
The previous paragraph immediately calls for clarification and 
specification. There are two problems about such a claim of 
"solving the riddles". First, it looks preposterous. After all, there 
are libraries o f scholarly works on Nietzsche, many o f them 
excellent, and all o f them trying to come to terms with his enigma. 
(19) Any new interpretation should first review the previous 
ones, analyse them in detail, and only after this work can one 
come forward with a new one, claiming it to be different. This 
book does not even try to summarise the previous literature. But, 
then, it does not propose a new interpretation either. It claims to 
rely upon a "higher authority" than even the best o f the 
commentators: the writer himself.
Under normal circumstances, such an approach would represent a 
lack o f scholarship, a neglect o f the basic principles o f a critical 
attitude towards one's material. But Nietzsche (just as Weber or 
Foucault) are not exactly ordinary thinkers. The claim is not that 
they have a quasi-metaphysical standing above others, in the 
sense o f the "great classics" whose every word requires reverence 




























































































that their reflections on the former works are not justifications o f 
content, but attempts to spell out the problem their work was 
trying to approach; a problem that was not clear even to them 
when they were actually writing. (20) It is in this special sense 
only that relying upon the "authority o f the author" does not 
represent a short-circuiting, a lapse o f critical standards, but the 
use o f a special kind o f extra information that should not be 
neglected when one is trying to make sense and use o f their 
works.
This leads us to a second remark about riddles. "Solving riddles" is 
meant here in a very specific sense. The aim is not to untie knots 
that thinkers fabricated in their spare time. Their solution is 
relevant only to the extent that Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault 
started and went ahead on research paths that have 
contemporary relevance; that can still be continued. All the 
riddles this book tries to solve are related to the possibilities o f 
taking up and in a certain way continuing their work
Finally, third, the presentation and solution o f such riddles is 
related to the kind o f audience this paper is targeting. It is not the 
small circle o f Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault scholars, and is 
definitely not the wider circle o f interpreters and commentators 
on Nietzsche, Foucault, post-modernity, post-Marxism, feminism, 
and similar fashionable themes. Perhaps hopelessly, the paper 
aims a public that is wider than the first and different from the 
second; an audience o f serious researchers in any field o f the 
social and political sciences who are engaged in concrete, personal 
research projects, and who do want to gain in this way some 
understanding o f the world in which they live. In my view, this is 
an audience that would profit most from a proper reading o f 
Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault; but they are exactly the ones who 
are most deterred by the style and personality o f many 
commentators - and in a certain way, especially what concerns 
Nietzsche and Foucault, by the writers themselves.
A clear dividing line must be drawn here between the proper 




























































































expectations on the part o f the audience, even if such a separation 
cannot be made clearly, especially due to the fact that publication 
exerts an effect on its own; an effect that is central to our 
concerns. Now, the actual audience o f Nietzsche and Weber, and 
even o f Foucault, was something very different from their 
possible serious contemporary audience. They had to establish 
their difference, to mark their work in a context and against 
adversaries that have long since disappeared, and false friends 
that they brought upon themselves. Many o f the tricks they used 
to differentiate their work, in order to avoid misunderstanding, 
today only serves to hinder understanding, by enclosing them into 
small circles o f the devoted. This paper tries to show that it is 
possible to use their own writings to bring them out o f this 
enclave; that a joint re-reading o f Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault 
can prove that they are not just boring classics o f sociology or 
extravagant, thought-inspiring, but unreliable master-thinkers, 
but initiators o f extremely rigorous, demanding, and interesting 
research projects with much contemporary relevance in many 
parts o f the world.
However, before going into a concrete analysis, let's return and 
review in some detail the question o f the "problem o f the 
problematics". What sense does it make that the problem 
underlying the work o f a given thinker can be a problem on its 
own? Under what conditions can such a phenomenon emerge? 
What is the specificity o f a work in which the underlying problem 
can be unknown for a long time? Or, in this concrete case, what 
were the assumptions on which Nietzsche's work on his previous 
work, his writing o f the Prefaces was based? What made such an 
undertaking at once possible and in a certain way necessary'?
Three such conditions can be specified. The first point is obvious: 
at the start, Nietzsche was not able to define exactly the problem 
that motivated his research. Second, in spite o f this, he had a 
determination to go ahead with his work, with an almost fanatical 
obstinacy, even if not only the end was distant, but the very 
starting point unclear. He was not just contemplating and 




























































































coloured and even shaped by a certain feeling o f uneasiness. 
Nietzsche was not simply unclear about the exact intellectual 
problem he was pursuing with such a vigour, but this problem 
was not external to him, was not just a peculiar riddle, but it had a 
fundamental relation to the world in which he was living; even 
with his own being.
These three points are in fact inseparable. Each o f them alone is 
nothing but an idiosyncratic peculiarity or the indication o f a 
failure. Taken together, they shape a tightly defined, rigorous and 
extremely burdensome undertaking. It was the feeling o f 
uneasiness that gave the problem he was pursuing. But these 
were the peculiar characteristics o f this feeling, its pervasive 
strength and unclear focus that started him to work, and with 
such a vehemence, yet made it so difficult for him to be more 
exact and precise. These were the three elements that constituted 
the peculiar configuration o f obstinacy and hesitation, o f strict 
determination and uncertainty about the end, o f sensing a 
problem but being unable to define it clearly, that set out 
Nietzsche on his intellectual enterprise, but also made it necessary 
that after a time, he had to reflect on the status o f his work, and 
to specify its focus and stakes in this manner. This was what made 
at once possible and necessary the writing o f the "posthumous 
Prefaces". This is the configuration that projects forward the 
circular character o f the whole undertaking, and the enormous 
difficulties, first o f all the recurrent problems o f method, that it 
necessarily encounters.
Finally, a few words about the particular, seemingly accidental 
conditions, the "effective causes" o f their writing. Nietzsche was 
always disturbed by the lack o f response his works received, and 
ended up blaming for this the publisher. Thus, in 1885, when he 
finally succeeded in getting free from the former obligations, he 
decided to re-publish the earlier works. When working on the 
new editions, he tried at the same time to make them more 
accessible to others, and to clarify for himself the problems he had 
about his own works. The actual Prefaces written reflect this dual 




























































































A full treatment o f Nietzsche’s case would require an analysis o f 
the previous Prefaces, followed by a study of the preface to the 
Genealogy , and finally o f the book itself. This goes beyond the 
limits o f this paper. A genealogical analysis would focus on the 
conditions of emergence (the posthumous Prefaces), and the effect 
(the book). However, our intention here is not to do a genealogy of 
genealogy, rather to give a short exposition o f the genealogical 
method. This will be done by an extended reading o f the Preface 
to the Genealogy. This Preface stands in the same relationship to 
the late Prefaces as the Prefaces to the whole previous work: they 
represent not simply a reflection, but a work. The Preface is the 
conclusion o f the work done on the previous work.
Sections two, three, and four o f the Preface tell the short, 
summary story o f Nietzsche's intellectual trajectory, especially the 
formulations o f his problem, while sections five, six, and seven, 
subsequently, describe in a nutshell the method developed to 
answer them: genealogy. All this is preceded by an introductory 
and followed by a closing section. But the presentation o f the 
gradual search for the specification o f the problem and the 
description of the method are related. Already in the first account 
o f his 'life story', introducing the central concerns o f genealogy, he 
gives a first formulation that will be elaborated in detail in the 
later sections, and in the book.
Section One
The first sentences o f the Preface can only be made sense of on 
the basis o f the former Prefaces. This is the first sentence o f the 
first new book published by Nietzsche after writing them. 
According to the standard view, a review o f one's former works 
and a writing o f new prefaces to them is an exercise in self­
understanding. The output is a better knowledge o f one's own 
work and self. Here, the first two sentences question this hidden 
assumption. The first states the opposite: far from obtaining full 




























































































second goes even further, specifying that self-understanding was 
not even the aim o f the undertaking.
And yet, in these and the next two sentences, he does give a 
certain kind o f self-definition, a specification o f identity. In the 
same first two sentences, he is talking in first person plural and 
not singular, as a "man o f knowledge" [Erkennenden ]. (21) At 
first, it only underlines the paradox of the statement, as exactly 
"men o f knowledge" (meaning philosophers, or spiritually minded 
people in general) are supposed to possess some kind o f self- 
knowledge. This is the point that will be elaborated in the next 
two sentences. In the third, Nietzsche uses a quote from the Bible 
to underline his strong commitment to the search o f knowledge 
that even defines the most personal part o f his being; (22) while 
in the fourth, he specifies this activity, this special kind o f search 
for the knowledge, again in quotation marks, as "bringing 
something home". These two sentences form a circle, providing, 
along the lines suggested by the use o f the first person plural in 
the opening sentences, a non-essential self-definition o f Nietzsche: 
he is someone whose being, whose heart is identical, is at one with 
the search for knowledge, who lives for knowledge; but also one 
for whom the act o f knowing, o f gathering knowledge, is deeply 
personal; where a piece o f knowledge is valued only to the extent 
that it is personal, belonging to "home".
So, in the first four sentences, we first have a statement o f the 
impossibility o f self-knowledge, and therefore o f a positive 
definition o f one's own identity; and a circumstantial, circular 
definition o f identity, in so far as this identity' is established with 
a general category': "men o f knowledge". While the first two 
sentences are about the impossibility and the second two about 
the circular definition, the first part o f the very first sentence 
nevertheless contains a reference to both aspects. These four 
sentences construct a set o f interrelated paradoxes about the need 
and the impossibility o f self-knowledge, the identity' and 
difference between self and knowledge. But Nietzsche does not 
stop at playing with words, has no interest in questions for their 




























































































heart o f the undertaking o f the Preface and o f the whole 
Genealogy, and even o f Nietzsche's work in general.
The remaining discussion of the section continues this play with 
identity and difference. Nietzsche is still only sketching the 
problem - section one is about the problem, and not the solution. 
If the first four sentences located Nietzsche's very being at the 
level o f knowledge, in the sense o f the search for knowledge, the 
remaining part clarifies the necessity o f the distance with respect 
to this identity, spelling out the reasons why a "man o f 
knowledge" does not and even should not know himself; that it is 
not self-knowledge that gives coherence to such a being.
It is the problematics o f the link between knowledge and being 
that, in different forms, is at the centre o f this section, and of the 
whole work. At each and every point, Nietzsche is connecting 
knowledge to being, to invest it with reality; and yet, in the very 
same act, he is signalling the existence o f a fundamental distance. 
In the remaining parts o f the section, this distance is established 
in time. The kind o f knowledge he is after is oriented not towards 
the present, but always to the past. Nietzsche comes out o f the 
dangerous possibility o f the short-circuiting o f knowledge and 
being at the level o f the investigator by establishing a distance 
between the "object" o f knowledge (one's past experiences), and 
what is the replacement o f the "subject" o f knowledge in the 
present (the search for knowledge, or the "will" o f knowledge). 
These two elements, the target and the "moving force" o f 
knowledge are still linked to the same person, belong to his being; 
but the gap that exists between them prevents complete 
identification and the subsequent short-circuiting, maintains the 
tension, the distance necessary for work.
On the basis o f the previous Prefaces that tried to define, finally, 
his problem, Nietzsche discusses here some general questions that 
in a way envelop the whole issue o f the basic problem lying at the 
heart o f the specification o f a research project: the question of 
knowledge, and the search for knowledge itself. The point is, in 




























































































the "object" and the "subject" o f knowledge, the objectivity o f 
knowledge, or the conditions o f possibility o f objective knowledge. 
And yet, it is also something completely different. It is certainly 
not a critique o f these traditional perspectives, as the whole 
question is not even raised in such terms; and it is not a sceptical 
position, questioning the possibility or necessity' o f knowledge. 
Who is speaking here is not someone outside knowledge, 
criticising it from an external or hostile position. Quite the 
contrary': it is someone who is an extreme (one could easily say: 
pathological, mad) follower o f the most traditional concern for 
knowledge, in whom the search o f knowledge became the aim of 
his life; his being itself. It is from this perspective that questions 
are raised about the connections between being and knowledge, 
about the best way one should proceed in his search for 
knowledge, in his research, by one who is not just gathering 
knowledge as a pastime or a profession, but for whom this is a 
fundamental, deep passion.
Perhaps we can go even a step forward. What Nietzsche is 
accomplishing here is a redefinition o f the links between 
knowledge and passion, knowledge and personality'. For centuries 
and even millennia, passion and knowledge, personal concerns 
and objective facts were opposite poles, as far as possible from 
each other. Passions were considered blind, irrational, foolish. The 
only way for the acquisition o f real knowledge lay' through 
restraint, ascesis, the elimination o f passions. In the same way, 
private interest or personal involvement were claimed to be a 
priori negations o f the possibility o f an objective, detached 
perspective considered to be necessary' in the search for 
knowledge, the establishment o f true facts. This was derived from 
the judicial origins o f the scientific method, the privileged position 
of the mediator, the impartial observer and judge.
These are points that would be foolish to criticise. But Nietzsche, 
heralding or acknowledging our modernity, takes a further step. 
He is not just making a point about the diabolical trap that the 
restraint o f passions has become a passion itself, leading to the 




























































































separated from its original, judicial aim, the search for knowledge 
now became separate from the utilitarian considerations that 
helped to establish the independence o f scientific investigations, 
outside judicial or religious concerns: but that this search has 
become a passion; that through centuries of shaping and moulding, 
a type o f personality was formed in whom objectivity, the search 
for knowledge and systematicity became a passion on its own; in 
whose case a detachment, a reduction o f the passions, an 
enforcement o f objectivity would only represent a hindrance, as 
all that is necessary for a proper scholarly undertaking has 
already been interiorised by him. We can say by an analog}' that 
to restrain their passion for knowledge and to enforce the rigid 
norms o f strict "objectivity" in this case would be similar to 
enforcing simplistic moral rules for individuals who have a strong 
conscience; or to make adults read today the kind o f textbooks for 
eating habits analysed by Elias that were used by adults in the 
16-17th centuries. The fundamental originality o f Nietzsche at this 
point can only be compared to revolutionary implications o f the 
Cartesian moment. Just as Descartes swept away the old, scholastic 
exercises, considered necessary for someone to become a subject 
o f knowledge, but rendered useless by the spread o f education at 
an earlier age and mass scale, Nietzsche calls for the elimination o f 
the requirement o f objectivity for those subjects o f knowledge 
who are so steeped in ascesis that can open up even their passions 
and subjectivity for their work. The fact that Nietzsche eventually 
failed does not question the possible general validity o f the point.
This point can be taken further, by establishing a direct link 
between this passion for knowledge and the Protestant ethic. The 
search for knowledge, defined as a passionate and deeply personal 
interest is not just an idle and idiosyncratic concern, a hobby. It 
has all the characteristics o f a calling, a beruf. One can even say, 
elaborating on Weber, that in the contemporary world, science 
remains the almost only place today where profession can still 
remain a vocation. We know now better than ever that all 
attempts to resurrect an "entrepreneurial spirit" are doomed to 
fail in a market-oriented civilisation, where the anticipated 




























































































mechanistic characteristics o f actual work. But "science" still 
remains at once the last refuge o f the "society o f the orders", 
where personal relations still play an overwhelming role, and 
where an ethical conduct o f life is still tolerated; where one can 
pursue his/her own concerns, passions, and interests, and there is 
a possibility for establishing an identity between one's own being, 
one's everyday life and work. In the Middle Ages, the difference 
between the agile, agonistic, self-confident warrior class and the 
remote, withdrawn group of monks and clerics couldn't have been 
greater. But could it be that the inheritors o f the warriors o f the 
Middle Ages are not just the "captains o f industry", but also the 
"man o f knowledge" o f today?
Nietzsche's point does not even stop here. If it is the case that 
modernity can be defined as the search for knowledge becoming a 
deep and passionate concern, it should pose anew a number of 
crucial questions o f method, about the link between knowledge 
and reality, or rather being. If knowledge, so far only considered 
as a superimposition on reality, becomes a reality in itself, how 
does this change the links between knowledge and being? What is 
to be changed at the level o f method, what can be gained if this 
passion, being so personal, utilises fully the being o f the observer 
as an object that is also a subject? If this were the case, however, 
will it not result in some kind o f short-circuiting between the 
"object" and "subject" o f knowledge, the two being collapsed into 
the same person? Or what are the different levels that these 
processes can located inside this "being" who is a "man o f 
knowledge”? And, finally, is there not a danger in this whole 
undertaking, the unchaining of a spirit even stronger than the 
"capitalist spirit", capable o f an extrem ely profound 
transformation o f being, o f everything outside knowledge?
Section Two
Such are the questions that loom large around this short 
introductory section o f the Preface . In the following sections, 




























































































sections will take up directly the two questions that are perhaps 
the most important out o f the series o f dilemmas led bare in the 
first. They will continue to avoid the short-circuiting by bringing 
in a historical perspective, and introduce a fundamental 
conceptual distinction.
The dilemma is the following. If a work is closely connected to the 
being o f the investigator, if this is an undertaking that relies upon 
and mobilises his whole being, then a way should be found to 
establish a distance with respect to oneself. One solution is to take 
the object o f analysis in one's past, and never reflect on one's own 
present. This is the way the second section proceeds, now giving a 
positive interpretation o f the accomplishments o f the previous 
Prefaces. If the first section was about the impossibility o f self- 
knowledge, the second gives the positive results o f those 
"attempts at self-criticism". This section discusses the way the 
ideas contained in this book got their first formulation in his 
earlier works, with special reference to Human, All-Too-Human . 
Nietzsche realised the extent to which he was still thinking along 
the lines laid down there, how much they contained the first 
versions o f this book. But he also found out something more. He 
was able to recognise, in a special sense, the fundamental 
coherence o f his whole work. This was given not by the unity o f a 
topic, a discipline, a concern, or even an explicit problem, as it was 
their lack that gave the starting point o f the whole undertaking of 
self-reflection. But, he claims, all his work was motivated by the 
same fundamental will o f knowledge.
Section Three
In the third section Nietzsche is continuing to retrace his itinerary. 
The direction and aim are still the same. On the one hand, he is 
going back in time. Section One was about the recent Prefaces, 
Section Two about the former books, while Section Three goes 
back to his first childhood piece. On the other, the central concern 
is still the link between his being and knowledge, or the search for 




























































































genealogy and similar kind o f historical predilections and 
imperatives: always go back in time, in order to discover the 
primordial form or the basic source, the founding act or the 
original institution or contract. (24)
Such a retrocession in time, a return to childhood and the first 
literary' products, together with such an obstinate concern of 
trying to locate knowledge, the subject o f knowledge back in being 
seems to confirm the worst expectations for a casual reader o f the 
Genealogy . It reflects the obsolete title, smells o f searches for 
origin, even if clearly with an affiliation with its modern, Freudian 
bent about childhood as the source of such original experiences. 
And yet, the very' first sentences o f the first paragraph already 
precluded such a reading. At every point where traditional 
genealogists and modern psychoanalysts are happy to grasp upon 
a fundamental identity, Nietzsche is always pointing out a 
distance, a gap, a displacement. It is not different in this case as 
well. At the very moment when introducing childhood, he marks a 
difference. He is not going back to the original formulation o f the 
problem, rather to a first sketch that even causes him uneasiness 
today; that he is "loath to admit". The rediscovery o f the origin 
does not lead to a happy experience o f identity and harmony, only 
returns to the central driving force o f the Prefaces: distance and 
uneasiness.
The uneasiness referred to here by Nietzsche comes from his 
contemporary' being. It is from this point that we get the 
perspective for the retracing of his intellectual path accomplished 
in this section. This reconstruction, instead o f telling the great 
story' o f his being or becoming, or of critically unveiling and 
questioning the deepest sources o f his previous life and work, in 
fact, turns inside out the major elements o f traditional genealogy: 
the genesis o f being and the recovery' of the point o f origin. At the 
origin, we do not find the first, even if rudimentary' - or perhaps 
the "true", the "pure", but forgotten - formulation o f his real 
problem. But neither is this first effort completely irrelevant, a 
joke with respect to which one can establish the correctness and 




























































































the present, either positively, through continuity, or negatively, 
through denial. The link between the first sketch and the final 
version is not established through a clear affiliation, a 
fundamental identity o f content, neither through complete 
negation or an unbroken linear development, but by a series of 
displacements. It was through such efforts, such transformations, 
that out o f a simple (though even at that time very peculiar) 
curiosity, Nietzsche developed his fundamental will o f knowledge; 
and that, following patient, long schooling and work, he arrived at 
his own question mark, his problem.
This question is in a peculiar relation with the original one: it is at 
once contained in it, and is orthogonal or "critical” to it. There is a 
clear-cut distance between the two: the latter questions exactly 
what the first formulation took for granted. Yet, in a fundamental 
way, the second remains part o f the first, reiterates it in a new 
form, instead o f setting up an opposition or an antithesis. This 
section contains the first demonstration, a working illustration of a 
crucial aspect o f Nietzsche's method, at once the consequence and 
reason o f circularity. The later formulations not simply contained 
a better, more precise, more advanced definition o f the same 
problem, but the original formulation turned out to be a part (but 
only part!) o f the problem he was trying to analyse and 
diagnostise. The first formulation was, and even had to be, 
provided by the same morality o f truthfulness he ended up trying 
to partially diagnostise.
In the reconstructive analysis o f his own itinerary, Nietzsche was 
always careful o f not committing anachronisms, o f not projecting 
back his contemporary state o f mind into the period he was 
writing about. (25) But at this point, it helps our analysis if we 
state the well-defined Nietzschean concepts sections two and 
three were about, respectively: the will to knowledge , (26) and 
the will to truth . (27)
At the start, in his childhood, Nietzsche's concern with origins was 
motivated by the will to truth: to get to the bottom, to find the 




























































































attitude diagnostised so well by Marc Bloch. At this stage, there 
are only two characteristics that distinguish Nietzsche from any 
other searcher o f "the" truth. The first is his unusual 
determination and persistence in this pursuit. If anything, he was 
more and not less "ill" with the will to truth than most scholars.
But he also lets us know that even in the first answer, there was 
something that went beyond the usual formulations; that the way 
Nietzsche pursued the traditional question o f the origin o f evil had 
a power to take it beyond the limits given by convention, 
therefore a transgressive potential. The second indicates a glimpse 
o f his originality, helping him in the whole long road, even if still 
only in a restricted, negative sense: he had a sense o f knowing 
where not to search.
Therefore, it is within the general horizon o f the will to truth that 
his problem was first formulated and his will to knowledge 
shaped, until he was able to establish his own ground and could 
stand up alone, wedging a gap between the two. But there is a 
fundamental point here: the central concern of the genealogical 
approach is that one is never leaving one's background horizon 
completely. This is what marks the specificity o f Nietzsche's 
approach, what defines the major difference between dialectics 
and genealogy.
It is at this point that we are getting close to perhaps the most 
fundamental aspects o f Nietzsche's whole method, attitude, or 
approach, that is even connected to his problem, the problem of 
the value o f the evaluations o f existence. One way to re-formulate 
this question would be to pose it as the problem o f criticism, or 
the critical attitude. This question is undoubtedly at the heart of 
Nietzsche's problem. But the question is not simply "what is 
criticism?". It is restricted in two dimensions. Firstly, the kind o f 
criticism Nietzsche is concerned with is not related to statements, 
but to reality, to being. (28) Nietzsche's points are only about 
being and reality, or about the points o f contact between 
statements and reality, and not about the internal logical *
consistency of statements. But, secondly, only a very specific kind 




























































































everyday world, the actual life, the practices and beliefs one took 
for granted, and eventually arrived at questioning. One can say 
that Nietzsche is only concerned with criticisms that are voiced by 
someone who was part o f the reality it criticises, and never ceases 
to stay part. This can be seen as a matter o f choice. But it is also a 
matter o f principle for him. One has no right, in the sense o f 
intellectual conscience, to pass judgement on a reality or a being 
with respect to which one is only in an external position. (29)
The previous paragraph only defined in negative terms, by a 
series o f differentiation, the space o f the problem. Now, we have 
to give the exact, specific, limited sense in which Nietzsche's 
attitude and method to criticism is given. Let us again start with 
the established methods. How is one supposed to criticise 
something like the will to truth ? What are the established, 
available procedures? First, one could reject it altogether, to 
denounce and unmask it as nothing else but the vehicle o f a 
manipulative force, a state, a class, or a religion; or as a negative, 
destructive force on its own. In this way, criticism means a 
complete turnover, a going from the inside to the outside, into full 
opposition and exteriority. This is the procedure o f Hegelian 
dialectics, or the spirit o f negation, the idea being that by 
announcing the denial o f one's former self, one can establish an 
immediate turnover, and become the very opposite o f what one 
formerly believed in. If there is a continuity between the two 
positions, it is only given negatively, by the fact o f denial. Strictly 
speaking, this logic assumes that every single belief, attitude and 
value formerly held has turned to its opposite, allowance being 
perhaps made to the exception o f natural or universal values. It is 
assumed that the new self is influenced by the old one only by 
trying to be the exact opposite, but there is no positive, concrete 
connections or continuities o f the two beings. This allows for the 
possibility o f synthesis.
There is an alternative possibility, still rooted in Hegelian 
dialectics, the idea o f "immanent criticism”. In this case, one 
remains inside, and proclaims himself to be the true carrier of the 




























































































thing. It charges concrete beings or reality in the sense of not 
living up to the promise or the principle. As an example, one could 
evoke the old discourse about the "immanent critique" o f existing 
socialism; but the same can be told about Milton Friedman's 
critique o f the market economy influenced by Keynes and the 
"neo-classical synthesis". (30) While the previous exemplified a 
complete denial and break, this is proposing a return to the true 
but forgotten origins, or original principles.
Nietzsche's approach is different from both. For him, a return to 
the origin is just a myth, based on the misunderstanding o f the 
actual origins. It should be evaluated as all errors, on the basis of 
their usefulness; whether they help to solve contemporary 
problems and conflicts, or only to sweep them under the carpet, 
and give pretence to an escape from reality. A return to clear 
principles, on the other hand, could be a useful way to reflect 
upon what is going on, and make suggestions. But the assumption 
that a perfect ideal can be realised at the level o f being does not 
make sense. Finally, a complete denial simply cannot happen. This 
is based on a misunderstanding of reality with its manifold layers, 
o f which only the value o f some can be changed at the same time, 
but not all. (31) This misunderstanding opens up a host o f 
problems: mistaken representation o f oneself, the denial o f 
connections to the past at the level o f one's own being, the need to 
posit a completely different ideal, and not the last the need to 
present "the" alternative, coming out as if from the head o f Zeus. 
However, as long as one is "criticising" something o f which one 
remains a part, one is not subject to the blackmail o f giving an 
total alternative. This would not even be possible, as such a 
"critical" undertaking starts with a distance, a gap, and uneasiness, 
and not the proposal o f a new solution. But if one is claiming a 
complete break with the past and the present, with "the" system 
and everything it contains, then, in order to avoid the charge o f 
nihilism, one will always have to present a new and total order of 
things. However, this alternative will always be an abstraction, a 
day-dreaming, far from daily reality, unable to take roots; 





























































































The previous discussion was still only is related to the horizon, the 
background, the taken for granted. It emphasised the fact that all 
elements cannot be changed at the same time. But Nietzsche's 
point goes further. In his version, the investigation will not simply 
remain to a certain extent part o f the world it tries to investigate 
"critically", but the problem which motivates the search, therefore 
the investigation itself is also drawn in its substance from the 
same horizon. It is not just in a negative way, as part o f the 
unconscious, taken-for-granted assumptions that the reality to be 
criticised is present in the study, but positively, at the level o f 
motivations or moving forces. Thus, in a way, Nietzsche is not only 
using dialectics, but also immanent criticism, in both cases turning 
the approaches against themselves. Instead o f a negation, a 
complete break, we have a series o f displacements; and instead of 
immanent criticism, the restoration o f an ideal, the point is that 
criticism is necessarily "immanent" in a certain way', but this is 
part o f the problem, and not the solution. It means that the 
investigation, at least for a long time, remains necessarily and 
fundamentally flawed, as it must be motivated by the same 
considerations that it wants to question.
But for Nietzsche, it does not represent a reason for despair. It 
does not mean that all "critical" undertakings are necessarily and 
always trapped in the very beliefs they want to question, and in 
the pettiness o f the everyday world they want to distance 
themselves from. One is trapped only if one is not realising the 
dangers, the fact that it is impossible to "get outside", especially 
not immediately; and that radicalism is only a "mask" o f a 
conservative will, a will to leave everything unchanged except 
what is the easiest to replace: explicit convictions and ideologies. 
If one is realising the stakes o f Nietzsche's genealogy, if one 
accepts, beyond the stakes involved in separating from what was 
taken for granted previously', the additional painfulness o f 
realising that it is not easy to find a new answer, and even more 
painfully, that the very investigation one is undertaking will have 
to be "doomed" for a long time, as one's questions will also be 




























































































"background horizon" whose elements (but only elements) one 
ended up questioning, then at the end, one may get the benefit o f 
posing the real questions, and eventually, even getting significant 
answers.
So far, we discussed Nietzsche's approach to "criticism", his 
overturning o f a paradigm dominated before, and for a long time 
even after, Nietzsche by Hegel. (33) To this approach, Nietzsche 
gave the surprising name "genealogy". Let's now review the 
reasons for this choice.
Genealogy, in the traditional sense, is about being and identity, the 
specification and localisation of one's identity in his being - in his 
descent, family lineage, and traditions in general. As we have 
seen, the first section o f the Preface overturned this 
interpretation, by offering a reading that located Nietzsche's 
undertaking not in an identity, but in a distance within his own 
being. (34) In the second part o f Section Three the other major 
aspect o f genealogy, the search for origins is turned inside out.
Here Nietzsche is not so much changing the values previously 
assigned, as shifting the focus, the importance, in an analogous 
manner. A search for or an affirmation o f origins centres around 
the very "object" o f which one tries to establish its emergence, and 
in this way define the identity. The question is to specify the 
origins o f an institution, a discourse, or the family credentials o f a 
prince. Any historical reference to the conditions o f emergence are 
accidental, only serves as a background against which the saga can 
unfold; can be used to illustrate the uniqueness o f the deed, the 
distinctive marks o f a character, or the novelty o f a form. But for 
Nietzsche, the opposite is the case. His version o f genealogy 
focuses exactly on these conditions. The realisation that the real 
question o f "origins" is about the conditions in which an 
institution, a character, or an evaluation is established gave 
Nietzsche finally the formulation o f the question with which he 




























































































In this section, then, Nietzsche gives the first glimpse into the 
genealogical method. But only a first glimpse, a formulation that is 
still crude. The same points that are made here will return in later 
sections. In order to indicate the rudimentary character o f the 
work at that stage, and also to maintain chronological faithfulness, 
the term "genealogy" is not mentioned in this section.
This is again not an idiosyncratic peculiarity, an extreme concern 
with historicity and exact chronological order, but belongs to the 
heart o f Nietzsche's method and work. The personal itinerary used 
here does not reproduce faithfully the way he gained his problem 
and his method, but it is a method that can only work and be used 
in such a fashion. Nietzschean genealogy is not a research tool that 
is freely available for anyone in order to use it for whatever 
reasons, but can only be bought, in the manner o f a truly Faustian 
contract, at the price o f one's life: one has to struggle his own way- 
through with himself or herself to find the problem, and to realise 
at the level o f one's existence the necessary displacements. 
Genealogy cannot be practised with relaxation and anaesthetic 
methods. Therefore, the method can only be introduced in the 
manner of the reconstruction o f an intellectual trajectory.
This leads us to the last reason why7 Nietzsche may7 have chosen 
this term as the catch-word of his method, a reason that fits well 
into his whole approach and work. When explaining the choice of 
the name "Zarathustra" for the prophet o f "beyond good and evil", 
Nietzsche argued that as he was the first prophet o f good and evil, 
he should be the one who is "over" with it before anyone else. 
Applying the same argument to genealogy7, one can say that as 
genealogy is the first and the most traditional method o f the 
search for origins, o f traditional history, the method that 
overturns all historicism in the name o f a new "historical sense" 
should be called "genealogy". This is a word that is shocking, thus 






























































































Up till now, the sole reference point of the Preface was Nietzsche 
himself, his own intellectual trajectory' - even if this was given not 
in the form of an identity, but in a series o f displacements. With 
section four, we break out o f this circle, toward the publication of 
the results. In this way this section continues the previous lines 
and introduces a new one. First, we have seen that in the middle 
o f Section Three, the temporal retrocession stopped at the 
childhood formulation, and after that Nietzsche started to tell the 
actual, even if reconstructed, story o f his intellectual path. But 
second, publication introduces a gap between the ideas 
themselves, and their eventual published version. Publication 
does not happen only once the problem has been found and 
solved, but documents itself the path made. The first publication 
only came when he felt reasonably secure about the project, when 
it started to live its own life, when it had his own path and field, 
when there was no risk o f being overtaken by established, 
existing forms; but when it was still not completely certain o f 
itself. It was necessary to wait and delay publication for a long 
time; but then, it was also necessary' to publish the half-digested 
results. (35) As we know from the experience o f the Prefaces, it 
was only through the former publications that the necessary a 
posteriori reflections became possible. It is these publications, 
these temporary accomplishments that documented the path, and 
in this way allowed him to step back from the work itself, and to 
redefine and reshape the focus.
In fact, there are two levels in which writing and publication 
becomes necessary', according to Nietzsche, for the subsequent 
development o f one’s own ideas. First, one should just put things 
down. It is by writing them out that one gets rid o f the ideas, 
overcomes them, and makes thinking possible again. It should be 
no surprise by now that writing for Nietzsche, instead of 
establishing identity, marks a difference. (36) Second, it also 
makes possible the eventual, later reflection. Even if it seems that 
the whole exercise o f writing o f the posthumous Prefaces came by 




























































































are indications that he was aware earlier o f the possibility o f such 
an exercise. (37)
One could argue that there is nothing specific in Nietzsche's ideas 
about the return to one's former thoughts. The view that there is 
an "interdependence" between thinking and publication, that one 
should continue with a new topic after a book was written, but 
time and again return to his former books are well-known 
techniques. But both some o f the elements used by Nietzsche, and 
the whole configuration are highly specific and original. First, the 
target is not to establish the identity o f the author, perhaps in the 
sense o f a continuous development, but continuous displacements 
and eventual returns through the trajectory. Second, the main 
question is finding the problem. The usual advice about returning 
to the former books is a return to forgotten principles, ideas, 
solutions. No one has suggested before a search for the "problem" 
these works were based upon. Finally, there is not just an 
"interdependence" or a "dialectical relationship" between the 
internal path o f thinking and the publication o f the stages o f 
thought here, but something much more specific. Publication 
produces effects, and o f two kinds: first, outside the level o f 
consciousness, it helps one to think beyond what he had thought 
before; and second, at the level o f consciousness and reflection, it 
allows one not only to step outside his own work, and go forward, 
but even to reflect upon it, and thus multiply the powers, specify 
the focus, define ever more precisely the problem, and in this way 
increase distance not simply with respect to the former thoughts, 
but also to one's whole taken-for-granted horizon. It is this that 
enables one to distinguish, slowly and carefully, between one's 
own project and its external conditioning factors; in the case o f 
Nietzsche, between his will to knowledge and the will to truth .
But Section Four is not only about publication, but also about a 
stimulus to publication. This is the section where Nietzsche is 
trying to construct his tradition. Even if the term was not used by 
Rèe, he names him a "genealogist", though he was called a moral 
philosopher; this is, by the way, the first time Nietzsche ever uses 




























































































seem to many, and in general quite rightly, as a meaningless 
exercise. Why should one need the authority o f predecessors to 
establish his right to speak? However, in this case, there are a few 
reasons to make an exception. First, any type o f knowledge fits 
into some kind o f discursive tradition: a scientific discipline, a 
separate sphere o f life, or philosophy. Nietzsche's work does not 
easily belong to either o f these categories, therefore he needs to 
locate somewhere his own discourse outside himself. Second, this 
is all the more important as his work is a kind o f research. It is 
not simply a Cartesian reflection on the critical powers o f reason, 
an analysis o f texts and forms o f reasoning, but an empirical 
investigation. Therefore, it needs specific methods and a body o f 
literature on which it can rely upon. (38) Third and finally, the 
kind o f tradition Nietzsche is presenting here is quite peculiar, 
almost a caricature o f the usual references to one's roots or 
foundations. It is a constructed tradition, by an appropriating 
interpretation, and not the search for an existing discourse. It is 
also not done not in a positive, but in a negative way. Rèe does not 
provide the answers or the methods Nietzsche will take up - in 
fact, Nietzsche tells us that he said "no" to his every single 
hypothesis -, but only in the sense o f the problems, the 
sensitivity. The work o f Rèe was nothing more to Nietzsche, 
according to this account, than a catalyst. It helped him to collect 
and formulate his own ideas. Therefore, in the remaining part of 
the section, Nietzsche goes through his own works, and gives a 
detailed overview o f the way he formulated his ideas there, 
indicating the distance both from the first and the present 
formulations.
Section Five
The previous two sections reviewed in a nutshell Nietzsche's 
intellectual trajectory, from the very start to the first formulations 
o f some o f the major ideas o f the present book. Section Three 
presented the intellectual path from an internal perspective, while 
Section Four introduced the external perspectives o f tradition and 




























































































line with the tradition in which he placed himself, he was satisfied 
with giving his purpose as the replacement o f a less probable 
hypothesis with the more probable one. Here, in Section Five, he 
steps further. Connecting the previous two sections, he states that 
his aim was even there much more than "hypothesis-mongering", 
and gives finally the major target o f this book, tackling directly 
the problem found by the Prefaces: the link between science and 
morality, especially the value o f morality, with respect to the 
question of the evaluation o f existence. It is at this point that he 
refers to his master Schopenhauer, and the eventual need to 
separate from him. In this way the other, more personal, internal 
component o f his tradition is also given. But here, something is 
clearly starting to go wrong.
In this extremely delicate, specific, circular way, going round and 
round around himself - which, however, is unavoidable, is one is 
pursuing the topic honestly -, Nietzsche finally arrived at the 
present moment. He should now define his method and the 
specific approach and purpose o f the book. But, in fact, at this 
very moment, and not only in this Preface , he is doing something 
more. He is jumping a step. So far, he wras documenting the way 
he was able to distance himself from and analyse a certain part o f 
the morality he was part of. But now, instead o f continuing a 
careful and partial analysis, he jumps directly to the assessment 
o f the value o f morality as a whole, to a diagnosis. With it, a new 
play with distance is set upon. He is positing himself outside all 
morality and all existing values, to a unique position, from which 
he can judge and evaluate morality, and even give and create 
other values. In this way, the whole carefully built-up balance is 
destroyed. The complete distance with respect to morality and the 
actual world as its supposed end-product leads to a loss o f 
distance with respect to oneself. In spite o f all efforts to the 
contrary, something has become short-circuited. Right at the top 
o f his work, at the moment o f the highest achievements, the road 
is paved toward his madness.
In fact, this jump will be a characteristic o f the whole Genealogy. 




























































































o f analysis, Nietzsche spoils the effect by immediately forgetting 
about himself, by running ahead in time and out o f style, in order 
to diagnostise "the" present, and to give prophetic allusions to his 
role, task, and destiny. (39)
But let's go back to the text, and try to make sense o f Nietzsche's 
diagnosis at this point: nihilism as the will to negate, to turn 
against life.
We have seen that Nietzsche's whole project was based upon a 
careful play with a series o f distances. There is a necessary 
distance between thought and reality, as knowledge and truth are 
always connected to reality in a certain way, but could never be 
identical with it, always remaining external. Then, there is a 
distance between his own work and the tradition to which he 
belongs to, referring to both his intellectual forerunners, and 
morality in general. Finally, Nietzsche claims the impossibility to 
pin down any identity, and yet asserts some kind o f fundamental 
importance o f identity and unbrokenness in existence. His 
diagnosis concerning the "hostility to life" is related to his 
assessment o f the way in which modern (Western, Christian) 
morality and science has, in a fundamental way, misunderstood 
this game o f distance and identity, and the "revaluation o f all 
values" is about how this is to be corrected. The analysis given in 
the next paragraphs will try to transform Nietzsche's diagnosis 
into a language that would make more sense to "Cartesian ears", 
(40) and to demonstrate the extent to which Nietzsche became 
entrapped in the same attitude he wanted to diagnostise.
The first point concerns a major transformation Nietzsche was 
trying to accomplish. The operation is well known, but the exact 
implications have not been considered so far carefully enough. It 
is a commonplace that Nietzsche was criticising morality, and was 
trying to replace it with "life" or "existence", as the major 
reference point. This implies, however, an attempt to switch his 
own horizon in its entirety, the operation that the genealogical 
method claimed to be a contradiction in terms. This would also 




























































































to unbroken unity, errors Nietzsche tried to avoid explicitly. But 
there is a way out o f this trap, a "definition" o f life that avoid the 
claim of unbrokenness, the metaphysics o f life, and that includes 
thinking and knowledge as part o f existence.
This can be done if we do not define "life" by some fundamental 
terms, but approach it, in line with the genealogical method, from 
the perspective o f gaps, distances, dislocations. Such dislocations 
occur regularly; they are events. An event breaks the existing 
state o f affairs, creates a difference at the level o f existence, leads 
to unforeseen situations, circumstances, configurations that do not 
fit existing patterns. The diagnosis o f a "hostility to life" therefore 
does not require a denial o f change and a claim o f unbrokenness. 
It is connected to the level o f answers given to these dislocations; 
to activities. (41) But in order to speak o f the answers and 
solutions given, we have to redefine the neutral, broad overcoat 
category o f dislocation or difference. A dislocation that call for an 
answer, for activity, is, if we remain at the level o f intellectual 
pursuits, a "question" or a "dilemma"; if we want to give their 
corresponding name at the level o f daily affairs and interpersonal 
relations, they are "problems" and "conflicts". In this way, we can 
now define the meaning o f "hostility to life". This is an inability to 
solve properly the problems, or face and manage the conflicts.
Of course, in a way, all conflicts and problems are answered after 
a time. But such an answer does not necessarily represents a 
proper solution. It may contain all sorts o f omissions, avoidance, a 
lack o f ability to stand up, attempts to hide and sweep away, to 
dissimulate; attempts that may succeed or fail, but which do have 
a significant and cumulative impact on reality. A genealogical 
analysis does not want simply to reconstruct the past, but to show 
how the past produced the present, and even to evaluate the way 
problems and conflicts was solved in the past, and assess their 
impact in this way. The diagnosis that Nietzsche is putting forward 
here therefore does not have to rely upon a metaphysics o f 
existence or a romantic philosophy o f life, but makes perfect sense 
in a Cartesian framework. It is not necessarily a prophetic 




























































































that certain countries, cultures, or civilisations may arrive at a 
point that they become unable to solve the problems and conflicts 
they encounter. From this perspective, a new assessment will be 
possible about the links between Nietzsche and fascism. As it is 
well known, he was first considered a forerunner o f fascism. 
Later, the untenability o f this position was demonstrated by 
Walter Kaufmann. But we can now state more: he was the first 
diagnost o f the oncoming of fascism, not simply by denouncing the 
emerging German militarism, but feeling in the air the oncoming 
o f a kind of hysterical behaviour, (42) an escape from solving the 
problems and conflicts, by at once pursuing the most violent 
methods, and affirming an ideal situation where all conflicts and 
problems would disappear. For Germany, such an argument today 
may only have a historical relevance. For East-Central Europe, this 
gives access to the heart o f the present. (43)
From this perspective, it is easier to make sense o f the closing 
sentences o f the section as well. It is about pity; the placing o f the 
question of pity at the centre o f the hostility to life, and his whole 
philosophy. This is somewhat surprising, as neither in his former 
books, nor in the Genealogy itself is there such an overwhelming 
emphasis placed on pity. The answer is that pity involves a 
perspective from which hostility to life and sheer accident or bad 
luck cannot be differentiated.
An individual can find itself in a bad situation through a number 
o f different ways, through misfortune, handicap, illnesses, often 
accumulated effects o f accidents, and so on. It may have a number 
o f different causes that can often hardly be disentangled, and 
where the difference between private and public, close and 
distant, personal and impersonal evaluations may give quite 
different results. All this takes us into the thick o f some o f the 
most intriguing and difficult distinctions to be made - perhaps, 
into the heart o f the problem o f distinction, the faculty o f 
separation, o f critical powers, and o f the way an individual can 
stand up and organise his own existence. (44) Flowever, a non 
differentiating feeling o f pity, if it reduces all evaluations to a 




























































































major or even the sole motivation o f activity and conduct, is proof 
o f a lack o f the ability to differentiate, o f the impairment o f the 
critical powers, and ultimately, results in the loss o f the 
individuals' abilities and powers to lead their own life. (45)
Section Six
This section is perhaps the most important part o f the Preface. 
(46) This point can be taken even further. This paper argues that 
as a result o f the posthumous Prefaces, Nietzsche's work reached a 
new height, that is exemplified in the Genealogy. This, however, 
also implied a loneliness that was too much to bear even for 
Nietzsche, and led directly toward his madness. It also argues that 
the Preface provides a crucial link between the previous Prefaces 
and the Genealogy, and in the sense o f Nietzsche's problem and 
methods, is more important than the book itself. Now, this series 
o f arguments can be crowned by the statement that Section Six o f 
the Preface summarises, in an extremely tight form, all o f these 
points.
First, the section is at a privileged place. It can be shown in detail 
that the whole book has a carefully built musical structure. The 
same holds true for the Preface , where, after an introductory 
section, different threads of the argument are introduced one by 
one, until they are all collected and connected together. This is 
done in this section, and with the highest possible notes. After 
this, Section Seven is more restrained, while Section Eight is only 
an after-note.
Second, it takes up the major points discussed in Sections Two 
through Five. The section starts with the last point mentioned in 
Section Five, pity. But, from here, he returns to section two, and 
restates the unifying framework o f his will to knowledge ; but 
does it by introducing the arguments o f Sections Three and Four 
about his intellectual trajectory and the way he found, after a lot 
o f time and work, his question. Finally, at the middle o f the 




























































































method already mentioned in the second paragraph o f Section 
Three.
But third, the previous points are not just repeated and connected 
here, but developed a bit further than previously. Concerning the 
will to knowledge , he is focusing on questions, especially on the 
way on should learn to ask questions. And concerning the 
genealogical method, he specifies the two instances genealogy- 
focuses on: the conditions of emergence, and the lasting effects. In 
each case, the emphasis is placed not on the "thing" itself (in our 
case, religious morality), but what immediately precedes and what 
follows him in the order o f reality.
These sentences give the clearest formulation o f genealogy as a 
methodological tool. But they are fitted into a context (one may 
say, this is what defines the conditions o f emergence o f genealogy 
itself) that specifies that genealogy is more than a simple tool o f 
analysis. All this may be considered to be in line with the whole 
Preface . It has already been mentioned before that the Preface , 
in its structure, in the arguments put forward, in its peculiar 
circularity and the attempts to handle this circularity, presents 
and illustrates the method itself. This is a method whose use 
cannot be separated from the intellectual path o f the thinker 
itself.
But surprisingly - and this is the fourth major point - Nietzsche is 
doing here something different. He does imply that the circle can 
be closed. In this section, the only previous section that is not 
alluded to is the very first. It is treated perhaps as a simple 
introduction. The point that "men o f knowledge" are unknown to 
themselves is still held as valid. But Nietzsche here seems to imply 
that they can at least know exactly their question, their problem. 
And even more: this question is no longer simply their own, but it 
is a new demand. This language already forecasts the terminology 
Nietzsche will soon use about his "task" and his being a "destiny".
Once this demand is found, Nietzsche claims or implies that he has 




























































































to truth he was previously caught in. All the carefulness he 
proceeded with in avoiding the pitfalls o f Hegelian dialectics were 
useful up to this point, but should now be abandoned. Therefore, 
believing himself to have become external to morality , he can now 
use terms he could not have done earlier: to give a critique of 
moral values; and he is not only able do so, but calls it his task or 
destiny.
From this position, he proceeds to give a diagnosis o f morality'. He 
claims that his method and the resulting perspective he acquired 
made him able to question morality', its very' values, for the first 
time: to diagnostise it as "a danger, a seduction, a poison, a 
narcotic” , and, most importantly', returning to the play with time 
the whole method o f genealogy is so entangled with, but now from 
the opposite direction, he denounces it as promoting living at the 
expense o f the future. Finally, from this position, he can turn to 
the final point o f conclusion, the most encompassing diagnosis: the 
"ty'pe o f man" (i.e. modern man) as a product o f this morality . 
Needless to say, here Nietzsche no longer belongs to this type of 
man: he implies that he managed to free himself completely.
Section Seven
Section Six defined genealogical method in the clearest terms, and 
also, making the leap, went to the highest sty listic pitches. Section 
Seven reassesses and repeats some o f the points made in the 
previous section in a different sty'le and from a different 
perspective: that o f actual work, and o f his tradition. Nietzsche 
first restates the novelty o f the project, in two key senses: one is 
open space, and the other the repeated emphasis on questions. He 
restates his alone-ness in the search, and the hope for company'. 
Finally, he repeats the topic that itself shows the novelty: it is 
morality as an object. His position o f complete exteriority is 
reasserted in the clearest possible terms. (47)
At this point, he returns to the other element o f the tradition he 




























































































and not morality or life, the work o f Rèe. For the sake of the 
argument, he assumes that the questions o f Rèe were identical to 
his own, (48) and reduces, with exaggerated modest)', genealogy 
to a simple question o f method. (49) The problem is not that it is 
not true, that genealogy is not "grey", but that it is not its central 
aspect. Moreover, this very point can only be understood if we 
index it to the peculiar self-referential modality o f the project. 
Genealogy has to be grey, because this is the only way in which 
one can write about oneself, without emotions and the need for 
identity; trying to analyse that part of oneself which is no longer 
part o f the "se lf, therefore can be subject to analysis. In other 
words, the moral past o f mankind is interesting only to the extent 
that actual living human beings are products o f this long 
"civilising process". (50)
This is the point where Nietzsche can revisit Rèe, and define his 
links to this approach. The two are similar, as both take an 
external perspective o f morality as it existed so far, the "moral 
past o f mankind". But the implications o f the two approaches are 
opposite. Rèe gives an external description o f morality, as if it 
were only a kind of error. In this perspective, once these errors 
are pointed out, they simply cease to operate. In this way, 
Darwinism (and, one could add, the concept o f Homo oeconomicus >' 
as well) made possible a peculiar connection, a short-circuiting 
between the past and the present: a link between simple, natural 
animal existence, and the characteristics assumed and promoted 
by modern society. They both start with a natural order o f things.
For the first, it means the satisfaction o f natural needs and 
desires. For the second, there is a certain kind o f competition, 
selection, elimination of the weak and sick. The system of thought 
that provided a connection between the two, social Darwinism, not 
surprisingly exerted a peculiar fascination and horror. (51)
According to this story, history is nothing but the long story of 
wandering astray, o f following all sorts o f false gods, principles, 
and values; the history o f repression, oppression, and wars. 
Instead o f searching for the deep meaning o f this history, one 




























































































natural wants and their satisfaction should be re-established. The 
task is to sweep history away. But there is one major point, one 
important thing about this history: the moral past, the recognition 
of the need to compensate for the events o f misfortune. One can 
even define the specificity o f human beings in this way. While in 
the kingdom o f animals, the simple principle o f natural selection is 
working, in the world o f human beings, another - and merely 
negative! - principle is added: the compensation for 
disadvantages, or pity.
In this way, morality becomes redefined as a mere compensation, 
separated from the actual, positive conduct o f life. Moreover, any 
question o f morality as ethics seems to be devoid o f any sense, a 
repression of natural wants and desires. (52) One should pursue 
one's own natural inclination, and bother only with two major 
points, two types o f interdictions, related either to human nature 
(man as an "animal", a being with instincts and desires) or human 
dignity (man beyond the animal state, a being with morality): the 
need to respect the liberty o f others, and to help and support the 
weak.
Both these codes imply an identity with others, in the sense o f 
empathy'. The first defines it in the positive sense: everyone 
should allowed to do the same thing, and that therefore no one is 
supposed to do things which would hinder the doings and 
activities o f the others. The second builds upon a negative 
empathy, in the sense that provision should be made to those who 
failed, or were unlucky. The underlying idea is that these two 
simple, almost self-evident principles are sufficient, and 
everything else concerning morality and religion is immaturity, 
error, nonsense.
In this way, one can discover, through the arguments that 
connects and distances Nietzsche and Rèe, not simply the 
fundamental principles o f the French revolution (liberty, equality', 
and fraternity), and the basic paradigms o f social and political 
thought ever since (liberalism, socialism, and conservatism), but 




























































































liberalism, and equality and socialism are well-known. But, as the 
above argument makes it obvious, there is not only an opposition 
between the principles o f liberty and equality, and the related 
political ideologies, but a fundamental communality. It is at this 
level that we can link these two, and separate them from 
conservative ideologies; a link that connects them through the 
principle that was often claimed "missing": fraternity. (53)
The principle o f fraternity occupies a peculiar position in the 
sacred trio o f the principles o f the French Revolution. It is full of 
paradoxes. This is the principle that has not been chosen as the 
major slogan by any o f the major ideologies and political parties, 
and yet, it looms large behind many o f them. One could easily 
propose to close the circle o f analogies by associating fraternity' 
with conservatism, the conservative cries for community, order, 
and close (quasi-blood) personal relationships. But, after all, this 
wras a principle o f the Revolution, and not the Restoration. There 
are differences between the traditional references to community, 
and the revolutionary principle o f brotherhood. Thus, one can 
propose that fraternity' was the most revolutionary' and the least 
realised o f the three principles. But this would underestimate the 
truly "conservative" character o f the slogan.
The reconstruction o f its internal structure can help us to find the 
proper place o f fraternity in the universe o f modern political 
discourse. (54) The first point is that statements o f principles 
made in the same period may not belong to the same "age" in the 
sense o f the history' o f the thought. Rather the opposite is true: in 
periods o f intensive change, the last and clearest statements o f the 
values and principles o f the previous period coexist with the first 
formulations o f the oncoming new era. Condillac and Kant lived 
and worked in practically the same period. (55) Fraternity' as a 
slogan is not a modern principle, but the last formulation o f the 
millennial dream o f the brotherhood of mankind, characteristic of 





























































































But it is neither completely a thing o f the past. The idea of 
fraternity is crucial for the functioning o f modern political 
discourse, and o f modern societies in general. Not as an explicit 
target, but as the hidden assumption underlying all the others. It 
is through fraternity, through the assumption o f both an internal, 
inherent solidarity with the others, but also (as this is also implied 
in the concept o f brotherhood) through the acceptance o f the 
separate entity and dignity o f each and every' individual that 
socialism and liberalism can coexist together as principles, can talk 
the same language and share the same political space. It is 
because the principle o f fraternity is fundamental to modern 
societies, but only as a hidden assumption, that on the other hand, 
all explicit attempts to promote this beyond, or even opposed to, 
liberalism and socialism are doomed to fail; (56) but it is also the 
reason why the attempts that try' to rely' solely upon one part of 
the linked ideologies (liberty in the case o f Reaganism and 
Thatcherism, and equality in the case o f Communism) have 
potentially one-dimensional characteristics, and - fortunately - 
can succeed neither. Finally', this explains how socialism and 
liberalism are linked together in the form o f social liberalism, that 
today seems to be the only socio-economic model that has a 
degree o f explicit appeal.
At this point, one may start wondering about the place o f this 
whole discussion. So far, genealogy was understood as a way in 
which a thinker could come to terms with his or her own work, to 
specify' its underlying problem, and drive it toward perfection. 
Yet, in this section, the topic concerns the taken for granted 
assumptions o f modern political thought, a topic that was certainly 
not at the centre o f Nietzsche's life and work. And yet, it is only 
with this discussion that the circle about the genealogical method 
is completed, and the full potential o f the approach is realised. 
Because genealogy' is not simply a way to look into oneself, an 
improved version o f psychoanalysis, but an approach that enables 
its proper users not only to specify the stakes o f their own work, 
but at the same time to establish connections with the central 
problems o f their age. Methodology' until Nietzsche assumed that 




























































































general, theoretical, and concrete, practical relevance, the 
subjectivity o f the researcher should be eliminated. But Nietzsche 
has shown us a way in which, through not just expressing, but 
working on this subjectivity', it is possible to arrive further than 
any positive method would enable us: to get access to what 
positivism takes for granted. For any type o f problems whose 
solution requires this in-depth understanding, genealogy is 
indispensable.
Fraternity', thus, is not absent from modern societies. Quite the 
contrary’, it is their fundamental background assumption. But it is 
exactly at this level that Nietzsche finds faults, and gives his 
diagnosis. His concern is not with the fact o f this brotherhood, but 
with its modality'. The universal link that binds together modern 
societies, according to Nietzsche, is based on the shared 
characteristic o f suffering, and the corresponding feeling o f pit}’. 
This is the lasting effect o f the past morality'. And the overlooking 
o f the crucial importance o f fraternity' in modern societies may’ be 
due to the difficulty to face the fact o f this effect.
As in this whole configuration that is spun by the principles o f the 
French Revolution and the modern political ideologies and 
morality', there is a univocal affirmation concerning past morality: 
it is dead, and is without any contemporary effect, apart from the 
left-overs o f the past that remained in the ideas o f the 
conservatives parties. It is at that point that Nietzsche is 
introducing the third major element o f genealogy: lay'ers, at the 
level o f being, especially the human being. This is at once an 
assumption o f the genealogical approach and a result o f its 
discovery'. It explains not simply the type o f questions Nietzsche 
was raising, but also their modality: the difficulties he 
encountered in the formulation o f these questions. The major 
point o f attack is the radical, absolute denial o f this short- 
circuiting between the "first and last" men, the idea that the whole 
history' o f morality' does not matter, belongs to books written for 
children. This was the idea that made it possible for the British 
moral philosophers to approach morality as their object; (57) but 



























































































point. Nietzsche makes the opposite claim: the very being that is 
rediscovered by social Darwinists, liberals, and socialists, is itself 
the product o f a long period of development: his whole being is 
fully invested with layers o f morality.
This is the fundamental assumption o f Nietzsche's whole work. 
This is the reason why history - moral history, in this case - 
matters: not because it is, or should be, alive, but exactly because 
it is, and at the moment it becomes, dead. This assumption guided 
Nietzsche's previous research, but was specified only at the end. 
But now, it is possible to re-connect it to the starting point and the 
diagnosis. Because, for Nietzsche, morality is not simply present 
still at the level o f behaviour, but this is what guides the action of 
the "modern type o f man", or rather what makes him unable to 
act, to engage in proper activities. And it is also through this point 
that Nietzsche returns to the starting sentence o f the Preface .
Modern man does not know himself, cannot know his being, 
because he is unable to realise that his actions are only possible 
on the assumption that whatever he does is something natural, 
although all this is only the long product o f morality. "Men of 
knowledge" also do not know themselves, but for a different 
reason. They do not even want to search their "true being", but 
they know their limits, they are able to investigate whatever is 
the product o f long history in their own conduct. The opposite is 
the case with "modern men", who are only able to continue their 
way o f conducting themselves, without regard for ethical 
principles, because on the one hand, they have already 
interiorised these principles, and because they mistake these 
internalisation as the "natural state" o f mankind. In order to 
continue acting, they have to misunderstand themselves.
This misunderstanding is necessary and different not only from 
that o f the "men o f knowledge", but also from the lack o f self­
understanding characteristic o f all other cultures. Nietzsche has 
two general points here. First, one cannot always question oneself, 
and especially not in the moment o f action. This is an 




























































































Tragedy , and adhered to it ever since. (58) Second, it is 
extremely difficult to situate oneself outside one's own world. 
Most cultures are unable to do so, to the extent that they often call 
themselves by the term "man". Modern man (follow ing 
Christianity') could do so and became universal. But this had a 
price. Like Christianity, which - especially if we consider the 
difference it made - is more an ethics than a religion, and could 
only emerge as an institutionalised religion on the condition that 
some admittance was made to the very tradition it tried to 
overcome, modern European man and society' also needed this 
self-misunderstanding in order to spread its influence around the 
world. (59) It had to believe himself to be at once natural and 
universal.
By today, this self-misunderstanding has produced a result. The 
whole world is following, at least in principle, and only in a certain 
way, some of these universalistic values. One can debate about the 
meaning and value of this influence, of this type o f "conquest”. But 
one point seems to be certain: that it is not possible to wage these 
debates in any meaningful sense outside the very' principles o f 
modern European culture - liberty, equality', and human rights; 
political democracy, the rule o f the law, and the right and freedom 
to work, to act. But what is even more necessary' today, when 
socialist and third-worldist dreams and nightmares are collapsing, 
is to realise the exact stakes and assumptions o f such ideals, and 
foremost o f all, the specificity' o f the Western type o f subjectivity, 
and the way all the development o f the Western culture has been 
based upon and tied to this type o f man. Not just in the sense of 
civilisation, policing, external constraints, and the need to 
fabricate an identity. But at the very basis o f the idea o f 
"progress" itself, at the ground level of its reality and materiality: 
the necessity o f taking up\he challenge, not leaving it; to be 
courageous o f standing up to oneself: to compose oneself, and not 
just leave it to the winds; (60) ^and finally, the most important 
question being the extent to which contemporary practices either 
build upon this type o f subjectivity' by taking it for granted, or 
undermine its very values by denying the possibility o f such an 




























































































It is obligatory to pose these questions as a fundamental matter of 
theoretical reflection and daily political and social existence, and 
not be satisfied with the ideas o f natural development (economic, 
political, or social), and innate abilities or human nature; ideas 
that may have been useful errors, but ceased to be so in the 
present world. At any rate, such ideas do not work any more - 
and the first proof for that is already arriving from East Central 
Europe.
Because Nietzsche's work reaches the hidden assumptions, the 
taken for granted realities o f modem man and society, it offers us 
an approach and a method to pose and answer such questions. It 
helps to introduce thinking into problems o f reality that cannot be 
solved by way o f simple problem-solving thinking - where the 
solution o f the problems themselves requires reflexivity.
To return to the text, Nietzsche finishes the section by a discussion 
of cheerfulness, following upon and indicating his distance from 
the pair seriousness/ morality. Here again, two points are mixed 
together. The first is that the end o f the old morality, the death of 
God is not a sad event for Nietzsche. On the contrary, it is a sign 
that what was important in that morality has already become part 
o f existence, it has become possible to overcome it. But it still 
leaves open an issue, important for Nietzsche: does this lasting 
effect mean that it has permeated the world? The differentiation 
between these two different types o f lasting effects will be at the 
heart o f the Genealogy . And it is here that the other, more 
questionable side o f cheerfulness comes into the picture. Nietzsche 
is ready to accept that the whole world is still full o f the effects, 
on condition that he himself is excepted. He is laughing cheerfully 
at the others, from the outside - at the end, arriving at the type o f 






























































































This is just an after-note, an additional commentary. It is written 
from the perspective o f reception and audience. Nietzsche is 
making three points here. First, he claims that it is difficult to 
understand this book without acquaintance with the previous 
ones. Given the self-referential and personal character of the 
work, as indicated throughout the whole Preface , this remark is 
not surprising. But the reason he gives is not simply related to the 
content missed, but, in a way quite faithfully to the genealogical 
method, to the conditions o f emergence. The point is that it is not 
enough to read these books, but must be read properly, in the 
sense of recovering their conditions of emergence. Thus, another 
circle is introduced here: the genealogical method has special 
requirements, poses special obligations not just on the author, but 
on the audience as well. This is what the final point o f the Preface 
restates, with an aim to give a hand. Nietzsche provides some- 
indications about how to read, how an aphorism should be 
decoded, through rumination. This takes us back to the beginning 
o f the Preface , and the whole undertaking o f the posthumous 
Prefaces. In a sense, they represent shortcuts, summaries, easy 
accesses to Nietzsche by Nietzsche. But. on the other hand, such 
shortcuts only work if acquaintance with the books themselves is 
assured. They help to digest their meaning, but are pointless 
without them. They only teach to read and understand, and do not 
supplement the actual work o f the reader.
Summary: a definition of the genealogical method
Let's summarise the three major aspects o f genealogy. First, it is a 
concrete method to study certain problems; a method whose 
specificity is that instead o f tackling directly its object, the 
analysis centres upon the two end-points: the conditions o f 
emergence and effects. It is a method that wants to assess the 
value o f its object, by analysing the circumstances and the kind of 




























































































uncover the extent to which this particular piece o f reality may 
survive, in hidden undercurrents, its eventual demise.
Second, this method is based on the central assumption that 
reality is not simply a uniform surface, but is built o f manifold 
interconnected layers, building upon each other. The sy'stematicity 
o f present reality is given by the peculiar configuration of these 
elements; but the elements, containing themselves numerous 
layers, live well beyond the concrete realities or things and the 
systems that connect them in their particular form. This is the 
reason why such a historical investigation is necessary in order to 
come to terms with the present.
Finally, the genealogical approach is more than a simple method - 
even if connected to evaluations, or assumptions about the layers. 
It involves a special type o f attitude, a relation the investigator 
has to himself, or rather to his "problem". This is the most 
important and the least discussed aspect o f the "genealogical 
method". Claims are often made about the identity o f method and 
content or substance, or that it is not possible to separate 
Nietzsche's, Weber's, or Foucault's methods from the concrete 
historical investigations they are making. This is clearly a 
misunderstanding, and is too close to the old, Hegelian-Marxist 
claim about the identity o f method and substance, or theory and 
practice. It is not the topic or the content that matters, but the 
interconnections, the joint search for the problem and the method, 
and for the link to one's life and age. The concrete investigations 
are merely testing grounds for the distillation o f both the problem 
and the method. Which does not mean that they' are accidental. 
The approach requires, again flying against the face o f received 
wisdom, that they must be autobiographical, have to be connected 
to the first version o f the formulation o f the problem and the 
method itself, and not simpty the link to the present problems. 
Any autobiographical work is obviously about the present, about 
present beings: and the need to connect it to external problem 
only helps to localise and exteriorise the problem, to come out o f a 
possible short-circuiting, the "subjective-personal" trap. The 




























































































oneself, between what is external and is to be overcome in 
oneself, and what remains of the "self' as the taken for granted.
This is a very demanding and specific approach, only suitable in 
the case o f very special kind o f problems - where the problem of 
the investigation itself problematic; when it is a study about one's 
own experiences, but not about one's self; only for those who are 
at once willing to engage upon a long and tedious research project, 
and also cannot help doing so. It also has its dangers. Nietzsche, 
Weber, and Foucault all struggled with these dangers and traps, 
not always with success.
An application: Shakespeare, Weber, Foucault
As an application for the use o f the genealogical method, 
understood as the way in which the full outburst and completion 
o f an oeuvre is the effect o f work done on one's own previous 
work, in the context o f its public presentation, let's shortly review 
the cases o f three major figures o f thought, Shakespeare, Weber, 
and Foucault. The neglect o f the effects such an undertaking, a 
genuine publicatio sui in the early Christian sense, may have on 
the author himself is a peculiar phenomenon o f modern 
scholarship. (61) A renewed attention may help us to explain a 
number o f other enigmas positivistic research could not even 
address.
1. Shakespeare
The exact dating o f the writing o f Shakespeare's plays has always 
received widespread attention in Shakespeare scholarship. By 
today, with a few exceptions, the dates have been fixed with 
considerable precision. (62) Their actual publication has so far 
been much less in the centre o f interest, perhaps because it was 
less controversial. But a joint consideration o f the possible links 
between writing and publication brings out something peculiar. 
Practically all the books that were published in Shakespeare's 




























































































fall between the years 1597 and 1600. (63) Only Titus 
Andronicus was published before, in 1594, and, except for pirate 
or semi-pirate editions, only Hamlet and Troilus and Cressida 
after.
However, Shakespeare did not publish in these four years all the 
plays he wrote before. A careful principle o f selection was 
established. The immature early works, like the three parts of 
Henry VI and the first comedies, except Love's Labour's Lost, 
were left out, just as later plays that turned out less perfect, like 
King John . The parallel is close with the way Nietzsche published 
his earlier works in 1886-87, leaving out all the Untimely- 
Meditations. (64)
But the parallels are not restricted to the facts o f publication. They 
also extend to its conditions and effects. First, with respect to 
conditions, starting from 1594, the feverish activity o f 
Shakespeare was not restricted to publication. This was also the 
period when his work was the most productive in quantitative 
terms. He was writing even three plays in a single year. But this 
was brought to a close in the very last years o f the 16th century', 
once the publication stream ran out. The combination o f feverish 
publication and writing had a tremendous effect on Shakespeare, 
culminating first in an implosion, and then an enormous creative 
explosion. First, just around 1600, he wrote three enigmatic 
problem plays, As You Like I t , Measure for Measure , and All's 
Well That Ends Well , often interpreted as being highly 
autobiographic. (65) These plays, by the way, have not been 
published by Shakespeare. Thus, the reflection on self has led him 
first to a preoccupation with his own life and being, just as it 
happened with Nietzsche. But after this came an even bigger 
explosion. In the first years o f the 17 th century', Shakespeare 
wrote much less than before. Academic administrators today 
would disapprovingly shake their heads in light o f such a lapse of 
productivity. But this is the time when Shakespeare wrote the 





























































































Finally, in between the implosion and explosion, and in a way 
bridging the two, there is a peculiar play, presenting all sorts of 
perplexities: Troilus and Cressida ; (66) a play whose exact dating 
is uncertain, suggesting that Shakespeare must have written it in 
an extended period of time, just as it happened with Hamlet ; a 
play that perhaps has never been performed in Shakespeare's 
lifetime, yet was published in a proper manner, in a way that is, 
concerning plays written after 1600, comparable again only with 
Hamlet, evidently with a considerable amount o f effort, in spite of 
not being the playbook of a successful performance; a play that is 
not a tragedy, neither a comedy or a tragicomedy, its genre being 
rather absurd or grotesque, showing more similarity to Beckett, 
Ionesco, or less well known East European playwrights like 
Mrozek or Ôrkény than to anything written in the 16th or 17th 
centuries, therefore consistently misread and misunderstood for 
centuries, suffering continuous attempts o f "correction", receiving 
proper attention and understanding only after the First World 
War. This suggests that in this play, Shakespeare gained an 
understanding of the dynamics o f European civilisation that 
enabled him to look ahead, into the twentieth century.
This paper argues that what made him do so was the application 
o f the same kind o f method that was later rediscovered by 
Nietzsche, and termed genealogy. The work on the previous work 
not only helped him to come to terms with his own life, and 
produce on this basis the most powerful literary' pieces of all 
times, but also to settle the relationship between his work and his 
age; to see things that everyone else failed to notice, or took for 
granted. (67) He realised the collapse o f the medieval world 
order, based on the principle o f belligerence and recurrent 
dynastic wars, and produced the first laic pacifist manifesto, well 
before the famous plan of Abbé St Pierre; (68) he understood that 
the end o f the medieval world was due not simply to a betrayal o f 
its values, but to the surfacing of a fundamental incompatibility 
between its two major values, justice and glory” (69) and realised 
that the way7 out is given by' the idea o f reason of state. (70) He 
fully understood that reason o f state is not simply a political 




























































































management o f individual passions becomes perhaps its most 
important component. (71) The relationship he established with 
his work, and through his work, with his life, gave him access to 
the heart o f his age, and even get a piercing glimpse into the 
future.
2. Weber
There are two facts about Max Weber that, even if not unknown 
by those who possess a fair knowledge o f his works, are still not 
considered to be o f much significance. First, Weber collapsed in 
1897, was not able to work at all for long years, and did not 
resume regular teaching and failed to give public talks until the 
very end o f his life. (72) Second, almost his whole oeuvre 
remained unpublished.
These facts are only interpreted in a negative sense, as 
unfortunate incidents, due to the objective facts o f illness and the 
early and untimely death that prevented the accomplishment of 
his work. Any internal connection between these aspects o f life 
and the work has so far been left unexplored. However, using the 
methodological considerations of this paper, new light can be shed 
on these elements o f the life and work o f Weber, with much 
broader theoretical relevance.
The first evidence to be questioned is the objectivity o f illness, 
that has been so far taken for granted as a natural fact. However, 
this should not necessarily be the case. It was just at the time 
when Weber lived that the relation between organic and psychic 
illness has been re-posed, and the causal primacy o f the first 
questioned. The reference is not to Freud and psychoanalysis, but 
to Grodeck and the concept o f psychosomatic illness. (73) There 
are many indications that Weber's breakdown was not just a 
matter o f physical exhaustion, but was due to the impact o f 
conflicting and over-burdening duties and expectations, especially 




























































































Once the deepest crisis was over, Weber could return to work 
around 1904. What he produced was not at all o f light quality. 
These were the years when both the Protestant Ethic and some of 
his most demanding methodological works were written. (74) But 
his work had definite limits in another sense. He was unable to 
teach, and was even refusing to give simple public talks. His house 
became a meeting place for many o f the central figures o f 
contemporary intellectual and even political life, where Weber 
was always at the centre o f attention, but years and years passed 
before he was able to open his mouth in a public gathering.
The difficulty o f building a bridge between the private and the 
public was also characteristic o f his written work. He failed to 
publish any more books, though became quite close to it at the 
very end. The few articles, mostly methodological, that were 
published came to light in small journals, often edited by himself, 
that can be more properly considered as working papers o f an 
association than open public forums. One of the reasons for this 
can be given in terms of a characteristic o f his illness: what Weber 
dreaded and could not stand was the presence o f deadlines. He 
was able to resume his work only when all threats o f deadlines 
were cleared away from him.
All this points out that the central problem o f Weber was not due 
to organic illness or mental fatigue, but a tremendous diffic ulty he 
had about externalising his work. This can be made sense o f in the 
following way. Weber was caught in between two conflicting 
exigencies: the strong moral obligation to fulfil both his 
professional duties in the strictest terms, and his internal, 
personal standards raised about his own work. He had to meet at 
the same time the expectations others had about him, and his own 
expectations about himself. In the context o f contemporary 
German academic life, the satisfaction of both demands proved 
impossible, even given his incredible capacity to work.
The conflict broke out with his nervous breakdown and 
depression. But once traces o f the provoked sickness left his body, 




























































































problem did not disappear. In answer, he close himself upon 
himself, imploded into his work, went ahead with his personal 
research, but he both lacked the forum in which to present his 
work to a wider public, and the will to do so. He was caught in a 
vicious circle: he could not publish his works, due to a number of 
uncertainties and fears; but the lack of publication prevented him 
to acquire the distance necessary for further elaboration and 
eventual completion. In spite o f reading Nietzsche, he could not 
arrive at the full use of the genealogical method.
The slow process through which Weber "reconstructed" himself, 
relying solely on his own powers, lasted for over two decades. It 
was only after the war was over that, perhaps also due to the 
shocking impact o f the events, Weber showed signs o f regaining 
his full strength, being able to give a full course, and also getting 
ready to publish properly his work: to re-edit the Protestant Ethic 
in a book format, and start the publication o f his works on 
religious sociology. In the Spring of 1920, he stated several times 
that he felt to possess the energy he had decades ago. (75) It was 
at that moment that his efforts were cut short by his death.
3. Foucault
The dilemma in which Michel Foucault's intellectual life and work 
were caught since the start was the same as Weber's: he could not 
teach and write whatever was dictated by professional standards 
and obligations, but only what he firmly and personally believed 
in. (76) Just as Nietzsche or Weber, Foucault took knowledge and 
truth as extremely serious matters; and just like Shakespeare or 
Nietzsche, his life and work were not separated, but werefuelling 
each other. This made him realise, right after graduation, that he 
could not engage upon the career o f a professional teacher of 
philosophy. He therefore got some other degrees, and took up 
relatively odd jobs until 1970. In that year, he suddenly became 
promoted to a chair o f the Collège de France . Due to his high, 
mostly academic sponsors, he jumped over the whole hierarch)1, 
arriving suddenly at the top. (77) This was the moment, one 




























































































vanished for him forever; when his work should have settled 
down, and driven on without obstacles. And yet, this was the 
moment when lost direction, and belief in himself. (78)
The review o f his own work, required by the candidature, (79) 
and the public lectures he had to give only underlined this crisis. 
Already in his famous inaugural lecture, he mentioned a difficulty 
to talk. (80) There, he solved this dilemma by referring to the 
unseen presence o f his predecessor, Jean Hyppolite. (81) But he 
soon realised that the trouble was deeper, located in himself, just 
at the moment when he was given the chance o f free public 
speech, he lost the ability' to talk. The result was that he gave up 
control over his work, and converted to the role o f the spokesman 
o f the oppressed. He tried not to become identical with the 
fashionable versions o f Marxism, Maoism, and critical theory, but 
only ended up doing the same thing, perhaps with much more 
consistency, and even more radicalism. While Weber wasted his 
time in a military hospital, in private lawsuits, and in try ing to 
become a member o f the parliament, Foucault championed the 
otherwise noble cause o f the right o f prisoners. Both have 
forgotten about the Nietzschean warning against chosing the easy 
road o f pity; a lapse o f memory that only points out the 
seriousness o f the intellectual crisis and the uncertainty' about 
themselves they all shared in the respective moments o f their life.
Foucault's Dantean wondering in the underworld came to an end 
around the mid-1970s. In the first lecture he gave in 1976, he 
was drawing a critical picture o f his past five years o f works, 
finding refuge only in the contribution it had to actual, on-going 
struggles. (82) But the radicalism o f post-1968 was soon over, 
and Foucault had to realise that there were more important things 
to accomplish in his life. He wanted to break away from his 
audience, from the topics that preoccupied his work in the early 
1970's. He reorganised the time-schedule o f his lectures in 1976, 
(83) suspended them altogether in 1977, reorganised the whole 
course o f 1978 after the fourth lecture, and failed to deliver the 
promised course on bio-politics in both 1979 and 1980, discussing 




























































































project on the history o f sexuality, a topic that was most personal, 
and even central to his whole life, and escaped into a proposed 
six-volume project, in order to justify for himself the suspension 
of his course o f 1977. Finally, he reorganised his whole work, 
shifting its emphasis, in a series o f displacements between 1980 
and 1983, first to early Christianity, then to the first centuries of 
the Roman Empire, and finally to the crisis o f Athenian democracy 
and the Socratian moment in philosophy.
He was working all by himself, on himself, and after the 
publication o f the Introductory volume o f the sexuality project 
that he considered a double failure, in terms o f content and effects 
on audience, he failed to publish anything for years. The depth o f 
this crisis, o f this desperate attempt to come to terms with his 
own work and the problem that was its moving force, was reached 
in 1979, after ending his course in April. After two obituaries 
written on the occasion o f the death o f a colleague and friend, 
Maurice Clavel, for half a year he even failed to publish his usual 
short journalistic pieces. He was intensely preoccupied with 
suicide; in April 1979, he even wrote a short piece on just this 
topic. (84) Everything seemed to draw to a collapse.
And yet, at this very moment, he succeeded to escape the crisis, 
by externalising it, with the help o f accidents. When invited to 
give a lecture In California, he met two American scholars, Hubert 
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, who were just working on a book on 
Foucault. This led him to re-think and re-read his own earlier 
work, to reflect upon them, reinforcing the earlier, less resolute 
and scattered attempts. (85) This external impact made him able 
to detach himself from the analysis o f contemporary 
governmentality and bio-power, to take up the suggestions o f his 
friend, Paul Veyne, and re-organise his project towards antiquity. 
(86) After the lectures given in 1980 on early Christianity, o f 
which there are not even traces in the well-known presentations 
given in October 1979 in Stanford, (87) he was finally able, even 
if not to publish, but at least write a manuscript - this is what was 
to become eventually the fourth, unpublished volume o f the 




























































































finally, in the form o f an introduction, gave him the occasion to do 
a coherent review o f his whole work. (88)
With this, Foucault was on his way to recovers'. He was still weak 
and uncertain, and longed for a change o f identity. (89) For a 
time, he only published anonymously, or appeared in public when 
asked by friends he could not refuse. (90) But, step by step, he 
pulled himself out o f the hole he ended up being, to a large extent 
due to his own earlier mistakes. The lectures given between 1980 
and 1983 are all stages in a breath-taking intellectual 
development. In each year, Foucault's thinking is gaining depth. 
His ideas are on a roll, and, slowly overcoming the earlier self­
doubts, he is engaged in a project o f writing a certain kind of book 
o f books: not the book the gives all the answers, but the one that 
opens up all the questions. (91) Though treating different topics, 
the lectures have a fundamental coherence: they are all focusing 
on the central problem o f Foucault's work, discovered through 
these exercises o f self on self, and defined as the study o f the 
links between truth and subjectivity. (92) This whole progression 
is marked by new' manuscripts written at the end o f each course. 
Though these are not yet ready for publication, each o f them is 
accompanied by new versions o f the Preface, new ways o f 
summarising his former work and defining his problem, that 
usually serve as starting points for the course o f the next year. 
(93)
The decisive moment comes in the first lecture in 1983. There are 
three points showing that Foucault has completed the circle 
around himself, his project gained its final focus and equilibrium, 
though not in the sense o f coming to a rest - rather, exactly due 
the contrary'. First, he begins the lecture by stating that the course 
will only be concerned with taking up some points left untied in 
the previous twelve years. The form of the lecture repeats that o f 
the first lecture o f 1976. Foucault is again taking a step back with 
respect to all the work he did before at the Collège de France. But 
the content is the opposite: instead of acknowledging a failure, he 
implies coherence. Second, the major part o f the lecture contains 




























































































crucial for Foucault, and that he was yet unable to analyse so far 
in a wide public. (94) Third, the title o f the course contains a 
peculiar word, parrhesia . It is defined by Foucault as the free and 
courageous telling o f the truth, and most o f the course deals with 
this tradition in different branches o f ancient thought. (95) But 
the major point is that it is with this concept that Foucault was 
able to pin down not simply the problem guiding his concrete 
research, but also the problem that was behind the major turns of 
his life: his inability to teach philosophy in 1948, or his difficulties 
with speech at the Collège de France in 1970, and at the same 
time the problem never solved explicitly by Weber, and even 
Nietzsche: the way in which any serious and honest intellectual 
work is at the same time a publication o f the self, a work by the 
self on the self, and finally an act o f telling the truth about others 
and implicitly about the self. These were the three themes on 
which Foucault was working in the Collège de France between 
1980 and 1984; themes that were on the one hand extremely 
personal, but one the other enabled Foucault to address and re­
formulate some o f the most fundamental points o f modernity, and 
of all intellectual work.
In this period, the topic o f sexuality, apart from the lectures of 
1981, perhaps the least interesting o f all five, was a marginal 
concern for Foucault. In 1982-83, he was seriously considering 
rearranging the order o f publication o f his works, to publish 
outside the sexuality project, (96) realising that the problem of 
sexuality was only an external conditions making his research 
possible, and not the central topic. It was just at that moment that 
he was told that he has little time left, and had to reorganise all 
his plans again. (97) As he had to make the most o f the little 
time that was left to him, he decided to complete the sexuality 
project, by bringing in as much material from the 1982 lectures as 
it was possible to do; to keep the 1984 lectures he wanted to 
postpone in order to finish his book, in order to present at least in 
speech some o f the ideas that most preoccupied him at the period; 
and with the Introduction to L'Usage des plaisirs to summarise, 
with artistic precision and perfection, interweaving, as far as it 




























































































and Introduction, the results o f the long series o f works on his 
previous works that were done, with such a crucial effect, 
between 1980 and 1983. (98) A point must be emphasised in the 
strongest possible terms: sexuality was not in the centre o f 
Foucault's late work, does not give access to his most important 
late ideas, and the fact that this and only this became published is 
due to the combination o f his wish to meet promises made earlier, 
and the need to make the most out o f the available material, once 
he knew that not much time was left to him. (99)
It is only by reading through all the unpublished manuscripts, 
listening through the tapes o f the lectures given at the Collège de 
France that one can realise to what extent it is true that the life o f 
Foucault, just as that o f Weber, ended just at the moment when 
they were gaining or re-gaining their highest creative potential. 
(100) One could say that the years wasted in the service o f 
different causes and the lack o f knowledge about the proper 
techniques of self in due time weighed exceptionally heavily on 
both o f them. Nietzsche became mad when realising the potential 
opened up in a world where God was dead by these techniques 
originating in Antiquity, and transmitted through Christianity; 
Weber and Foucault, in spite o f their reliance on Nietzsche, needed 
almost to rediscover them, and did so all too late.
Foucault had the same dream as Shakespeare about waiving 
farewell to his audience, revealing that in this relationship, the 
mighty Prospéra only played the role o f the fragile Ariel, and 
retire to his county house. (101) Only, it was not given to him to 
make a reality out o f this dream.
A last remark
At this point, we can return to the starting sentence of the paper: 
the surprising claim about Nietzsche's method. Hopefully, both the 
analysis o f Nietzsche late works and their application have shown 
that genealogy is in fact a method; it is even in a strict sense a 




























































































work. But, undoubtedly, the meaning o f both words are displaced 
when applied to genealogy. It is certainly not a method or a 
technique in the sense o f giving tools for objective research. 
Rather, genealogical method is a technique o f self. Whoever is 
applying it to solve uncertainties concerning one's own project and 
at the same time to increase creative potential has to accept the 






























































































( 1 ) This paper is a chapter from a book in progress, entitled 
'Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault: In Search of a Problem'. It benefits a 
lot from discussions with participants of my seminar at the 
European University Institute, particularly Monica Greco,
Sebastian Rinken, and Stefan Rossbach. In its revision, a seminar 
paper by Stefan Rossbach entitled 'The Author's Care o f Himself: 
On Nietzsche, Foucault, and Luhmann', part o f his Ph.D. project 
entitled 'The Autopoiesis o f International Relations' proved to be 
most useful and reinforcing.
(2) See for e.g. Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles (The 
University o f Chicago Press, 1979); and Michael Allen Gillespie and 
Tracy B. Strong (eds) Nietzsche's New Seas: Explorations in 
Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Politics (The University o f Chicago 
Press, 1988).
(3) For the most often quoted work, see 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History', in Paul Rabinow (ed). The Foucault Reader (N.Y., 
Pantheon, 1984). However, there are two problems here. First, the 
translation o f the paper is far from being perfect, rendering 
especially the last paragraphs obscure and incomprehensible in 
English. Second, though this text is usually revered as the last 
word and key to Foucault's relationship to Nietzsche, (for a recent 
example, see Leslie Paul Thiele, 'The agony of politics: the 
Nietzschean roots o f Foucault’s thought', American Political Science 
Review 84 (1990), 3: 907-925, that on p. 915 simply repeats the 
standard arguments of the literature) it is in fact the product of 
very peculiar period in Foucault's life, and by no means exhausts 
Foucault's methodological reliance upon Nietzsche, not to say 
Nietzsche's method. For some important late remarks, see The 
Return o f Morality', in Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed), Politics, 
Philosophy, Culture (Routledge, London, 1988),
(4) For studies on Weber and Nietzsche, see Wilhelm Hennis,
'The Traces o f Nietzsche in the Work of Max Weber', in 
Hennis, 1988; Robert Eden Political Leadership and Nihilism: A 
Study o f Weber and Nietzsche (Gainesville, Florida, 1984), and 
'Weber and Nietzsche', in W. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel (eds.), 
Max Weber and his Contemporaries (London, Allen, 1987); David 
Owen, 'Autonomy and 'inner distance': a trace o f Nietzsche in 
Weber', in: History' o f the Human Sciences, 1991, 1:81-91; and 
Colin Gordon, 'The Soul o f the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel 
Foucault on Rationality and Government', in: Scott Lash and Sam 
Whimster (eds.), Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity (London, 
Allen, 1987),
(5) In an unpublished interview, Foucault stated that "si 




























































































Weber absolument déterminant, même si en général on ne le dit 
pas". See 'A propos de Nietzsche, Habermas, Arendt, MacPherson', 
April 1983 conversation at Berkely; Foucault Archives, D 250 (8), 
p. 14. This may be an overstatement, explaining why it remained 
unpublished, but the possibility o f such an overstatement having 
been made is important. Also, in the lectures given at the Collège 
de France between 1980 and 1984, Weber's work was one o f the 
few recurrent and important points o f reference. These lectures 
are unpublished, but can be consulted in tape in the Foucault 
Archives at the Bibliothèque de Saulchoir in Paris. For the 
permission to use the Archives, I am grateful for the Centre 
Michel Foucault.
(6) See Discipline and Punish (New York; Vintage Books, 1979 
[1975]); The History o f Sexuality, Vol. One: The Will to Knowledge 
(New York, Vintage Books, 1980 [1976]); and Colin Gordon (ed), 
Power/ Knowledge: Selected interviews and Other Writings by 
Michel Foucault, 1972-1977, (Brighton, Harvester Press, 1980).
(7) See, for e.g., its explicit acknowledgement at the beginning of 
the first lecture given in 1976 (see Colin Gordon (ed), Power/ 
Knowledge , pp. 78-79), and also the often cited 'Truth and Power' 
interview, whose almost every' word, referring to Foucault's own 
trajectory', is incorrect (ibid., pp. 109-111.).
(8) For perhaps the first such example, see J. Miller, ’Some 
Implications of Nietzsche's Thought for Marxism', Telos, no.37 
(1978).
(9) See Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Univ of Chicago Press, 
1982), p.106.
(10) See Jeffrey Minson, Genealogies o f Morals: Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Donzelot and the Eccentricity'of Ethics (London, 
Macmillan, 1985), which is weak on precise methodological 
analysis, rather motivated by an attempt to re-vitalise socialist 
project; and Thiele, 'The agony o f politics', 1990, where the topic is 
politics and struggle.
(11) For e.g. in the important Fifth Book o f the Gay Science, 
published in 1887, there are four crucial sections about origins, 
(No-s 348, 349, 353, 355) discussing some o f Nietzsche's key ideas 
on history', yet there is no use o f the word "genealogy'".
(12) See the Preface to the Genealogy o f Morals , section 8.
(13) For e.g., it was so widely asserted that this was Nietzsche's 
key work that Walter Kaufmann even took issue with it, and tried 
to revaluate Nietzsche's last writings.
(14) Such prefaces were written for the The Birth o f Tragedy, 
separately for the two volumes o f Human, Ali-too Human , for 





























































































(15) Nietzsche finished the last Preface (to Gay Science ) in the 
Fall o f 1886, which included new material in the Fifth Book, from 
earlier notebooks, and followed with the Preface to the Genealogy 
of Morals in July 1887.
(16) I have not yet encountered any comprehensive, serious 
attempts to treat and analyse the Prefaces together. A  section o f a 
recently published article does contain a short and interesting 
analysis o f the Prefaces, but putting the emphasis on the middle 
period of Nietzsche, therefore leaving out the Preface to the Birth 
o f the Tragedy altogether. See Howard Caygill, 'Affirmation and 
eternal return in the Free-Spirit Trilogy', in Keith Ansell-Pearson 
(ed) Nietzsche and Modem German Thought (London, Routledge, 
1991). In 1992, for the first time, they have been published 
together as Tentativo di autocritica, 1886-1887 (Genova, 11 
Melangolo, 1992), but the emphasis is on their relevance for style, 
not method.
(17) This is certainly true for Christianity, the main topic o f the 
book - one should only recall the several instances o f the New 
Testament. For e.g., see Matthew 5:46-8, 8:22, 12:46-9, and esp. 
10:35. One could even risk to say that this was the target o f Jesus: 
to destroy and replace traditional social order, based on 
genealogical relations: even if he was also obliged to make many 
explicit and implicit compromises.
(18) Nietzsche states here that the third section is an example 
about how to decipher an aphorism. This is, o f course, true, but is 
far from being the whole story.
(19) As an indication, let me refer to one o f the bests, the classic 
work o f Deleuze, that starts with the following sentence: "Le projet 
le plus général de Nietzsche consiste en ceci: introduire en 
philosophie les concepts de sens et de valeur." (Gilles Deleuze, 
Nietzsche et la philosophie, Paris: P.U.F., 1962, p.l.). Incidentally, 
Deleuze has this tendency to start his works with such loaded, 
unequivocal sentences. The concluding section to his 1986 book 
entitled Foucault starts with the following sentence: "Le principe 
général de Foucault est: toute forme est un composé de rapports 
de forces." (Paris, Minuit, p.131). Apart from the fact that I do not 
agree with any o f these statements, the problem is that it 
immediately defines and limits the project o f Deleuze as an 
imposed interpretation.
(20) A short counterposing o f Durkheim and Weber may help to 
illustrate this point. Sociology, we are told, is built on the common 
points between these two major thinkers. Yet, their best known 
books, that on a first look share a number o f similarities, start in a 
fundamentally different way. Durkheim starts Suicide with 




























































































while Weber spends the whole first part o f the Protestant Ethic 
trying to specify his problem.
(21) This can be contrasted to the similar terminology in 
Schopenhauer as educator. There Nietzsche is using, in somewhat 
pejorative sense, the word Gelehrten , i.e. "learned" men. The 
difference does not appear clearly in the English translations 
("men o f learning" vs "men o f knowledge"). See in Untimely 
Meditations (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.169.
(22) Even the word "commitment" is misleading here, as that 
would assume as if Nietzsche would exists "outside" his will to 
knowledge, while the point is that his whole being is identical 
with this search.
(23) See Nietzsche's comments against the lovers o f the question 
mark in Beyond Good and Evil.
(24) For an attack against such concerns from the perspective of 
modern historiography, see Marc Bloch on "L'idole des origines", in 
his Apologie pour l'histoire ou métier d'historien (Armand Colin, 
Paris, 1974), pp. 37-41.
(25) This point is valid for the reconstructions of trajectory done 
in all the Prefaces.
(26) This concept is elaborated later in the notes published as Will 
to Power, wherewill to knowledge is defined as a form of thewill 
to power.
(27) For a definition, see section 4 o f the late Preface to the Gay 
Science on the "Egyptian" search and unveiling that is reprinted 
in toto in the end o f Nietzsche contra Wagner, Nietzsche's last 
published work, and also Gay Science , 343.
(28) It is after Kant that these two aspects o f "criticism" have 
been separated. One line o f thinkers continued to renew the 
concern with the "true" Kantian sense o f "criticism". This is true 
for the different neo-Kantian schools, Russell and analytical 
philosophy, and logical positivism. On the other hand, there are 
the different branches o f critical theories or critiques o f society, 
decrying the concern with the truth o f statements or the 
"linguistic turn". This whole opposition can be summed up by two 
words, Vienna and Frankfurt, casting a large shadow o f almost all 
aspects o f intellectual development since WWII - paradoxically, 
both referring to scholars who exerted their most important 
influence as exiles. Two problems about this separation should be 
mentioned here. On the one hand, all versions o f neo-Kantianism 
forgot to be concerned with questions o f being, its different 
possible and existing modes and forms, relegating it to the realm 
of metaphysics. On the other hand, critical theories suffered from 
two fundamental defects. First, they based their methodology on 
Hegel, when - as this Chapter wants to prove - this, concerning the 












































































































































































































































































































digested and superseeded by Nietzsche. Second, directly following 
from the deficiencies o f Hegel's dialectics, critical theorists got the 
link between Hegel and Kant wrong. They interpreted Hegel as 
fully superseeding Kant, and not as a partial displacement within 
his general thought, and therefore, following Marx, fell back to a 
pre-Kantian epistemological stance. This can be seen for example 
in the reflection-theory o f Lukacs, according to which all 
theoretical concepts and works o f art are and should be evaluated 
solely as reflections or representations o f "reality'". The point is 
reinforced by the recent, fervent reappraisal o f Kant, widespread 
among former Marxist or critical theorists.
(29) The point is that professional expertise has no access to its 
own taken for granted assumptions. When such assumptions are 
embedded in reality, this deficiency does not appear at the 
pragmatic level. However, when the frameworks o f reality are 
different, professional expertise becomes either meaningless, or a 
simple tool for social engineering. The latter occasionally may 
even be useful or necessary, but professional knowledge cannot 
say' when and how.
(30) Even the language used is the same. Thus, Chicago and 
supply-side economists asserted already from the mid-1980s that 
the problem was not with their theories, but with Reagan, who did 
not apply their theories fully'.
(31) This point is close to the well-known metaphor of Quine 
about repairing a ship on the sea: it is possible to change some of 
its components, but not all at the same time.
(32) It is this perspective that gives us access to understanding 
the current situation, the depth of the problems o f East-Central 
Europe. The problem is not simply the "legacy of communism”, but 
o f a deep-seated, pervasive "hostility to life".
(33) In this operation, the role o f Schopenhauer was crucial for 
Nietzsche; the acknowledgements given both in the Untimely- 
Meditations and Section Five are well-deserved. Hegel and 
Schopenhauer tried to treat respectively the two major lacunas in 
Kant’s system: change (dialectics) and introspection (ascesis). 
Nietzsche brought their points together in a way that rendered 
both o f them (though not Kant) obsolete.
(34) To illustrate this method o f "partial opposites", let’s take the 
example o f a computer that, instead of zeros and ones, works with 
negative and positive values. The method o f Nietzsche is to take 
some o f these values and switch them to the opposite. The basic 
points o f this technique are the following. First, only a few such 
values are changed; second, there, however, the change is 
complete, and not gradual; but third, even so, the whole structure, 




























































































structure remain unchanged. It is a series o f such changes that 
eventually build up a brand new system or global structure.
(35) This recalls Nietzsche's often repeated caveat about the 
importance o f keeping silent long enough. As we shall see in the 
application, a lack of willingness or opportunity to do so created 
fundamental problems for both Weber and Foucault.
(36) This is a point like all points about Nietzsche's "genealogy": 
they are difficult enough to decode and understand, but even 
more difficult to follow. There are only too many "Nietzschean" 
and "Foucaldian" theorists and researchers who are professing to 
follow some or other aspects o f the genealogical methods, but who 
establish their identity by writing and publication, and do not 
tolerate different readings. This is a temptation that is is around 
everyone, in each and every single act o f writing and talking, and 
most o f the time can only be corrected ex post - when the stakes 
o f admitting mistakes are already too high.
(37) In Schopenhauer as Educator, first published in 1874, 
twelve years before the late Prefaces, Nietzsche poses the 
following question:"But how can we find outselves again? How can 
man know himself?", and lists a few lines below, after discussing 
the difficulties and dangers o f the whole issue, as possible tools, 
"our memoryand that which we do not remember, our books and 
our handwriting". Here, however, he claims to have found a better 
method: "Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to 
you what the true basic material o f your being is", (p. 129). 
Needless to say, later Nietzsche overcame this view - though to 
reach this state, he had to go through it. This explains why 
Nietzsche did not felt it necessary to reprint again the Untimely 
Meditations in 1886, even if he republished both earlier and later 
works. This is elaborated in the relevant sections of Ecce Homo.
(38) Philosophers do not need to establish their own tradition, 
and often pour scorn on the social sciences making such a fuzz 
about the "classics" and the "origins" o f the discipline. But this is 
only so because philosophers have Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as 
an everpresent reference point, not to mention authors closer to 
us like Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, or Kant. If one would take away 
only the names listed, philosophy would all but collapse 
immediately. This hypothethical situation is a real one in which 
innovators in the field o f research related to society, politics, and 
culture often find themselves. As an example, let me only refer to 
the case o f Dumézil, who in his last years gave a detailed account 
o f his related troubles. See Georges Dumézil, Entretiens avec Didier 
Eribon (Paris, Gallimard, 1987), and Mythes et dieux des indo- 




























































































(39) In the late Preface to the Birth o f Tragedy, Nietzsche himself 
said that he "spoiled" the Greek problem. It seems that he was not 
fully able to overcome this tendency or inclination even later.
(40) Needless to say, from the prespective o f the method 
described in this chapter, there is no point in joining a post­
modern, anti-Cartesian and anti-Husserlian reading o f Nietzsche.
(41) The three categories described here correspond to the three 
types o f verbs, related to states o f existence, events, and activities.
(42) See one of the most important articles o f the Hungarian 
thinker istvan Bibo, 'A nemet politikai hiszteria okai and 
tortenete’ (The causes and history of the german political 
hystery), in: Valogatott tanulmanyok (Selected studies), Budapest, 
Magveto, 1986 [1945]. Unfortunately, Nietzsche conflated his 
analysis o f Christianity and contemporary' Germany.
(43) This idea o f problem- and conflict escaping is taken from 
Agnes Horvath: Konfliktus nelkuli teriilet: az allamerdek politikai 
diskurzusai Magyarorszagon (Area without conflict: the political 
discourses o f reason o f state in Hungary). Manuscript, April 1993.
(44) In fact, "criticism" in the original sense (diacrisis in Greek, 
discretio in Latin) meant just this faculty o f separation. The 
history o f the links and separation of criticism and judgment, and 
the way in which this is connected to the curious loss o f this 
power in modern societies (leading to the desperate search for 
objective methods), and finally how all this is linked to the crucial 
distinction between the "private" and the "public" (the neglect of 
privacy is an "indiscretion"; however, this meaning o f "discretion" 
is relatively new, dates from the 18th century', replacing the 
earlier meaning, which was the ability to distinguish, thus was 
connected to the self, and not to the others) would be a fascinating 
topic that cannot be pursued here.
(45) Taking Nietzsche's point further, it is possible to make some 
points about contemporary East European and Western societies. 
Nietzsche's diagnosis about "hostility to life" does have a large 
degree o f validity' in both cases, though in different manners. In 
East Europe - not simply as a result o f Communism, but of whole 
centuries o f "parasitic" relationship to the West - an extremely 
dangerous situation o f complete unability to distinguish and to 
solve problems emerged. In the West, on the surface, things look 
completely opposite. This is a civilisation that seemingly became 
able to solve all the problems it encounters, where problem­
solving and pragmatism became its very philosophy o f life. 
However, there is a paradox even here. Perhaps because o f its 
pragmatism and because of the importance attributed to problem­
solving, individuals are not left to actually solve the problems 
themselves, by their own strength and ingenuity, but are 




























































































step; and the strength o f character, its composure and unity is not 
measured by the way one is actually making distinctions and 
solving the problems, but the way one takes up and identifies 
with such models as his own. To use medical language, one can say 
that Western societies immunise their members against the 
possibility that they may not be able to solve their problems; 
while East-European societies have become immunised against 
this immunisation. The Western case leaves us with the possibility 
that once one has learned his way around in society, may step 
outside the masks or the normalising techniques and, without 
leaving the broad horizon, compose himself. The trick here that 
this requires partly the same solution of "stepping outside" the 
official powers that was necessary in non-modern societies to 
realise an autonomous, sovereign existence, while modern society 
claims that it actually does realise such a possibility on a mass 
scale (this, o f course, does not make sense, as it is a contradiction 
in terms); but the situation is still obviously not the same, because 
social order in modem societies does not (or no longer does) apply 
the kind o f violent methods exercised elsewhere.
(46) It is all the more surprising that Foucault did not refer to 
this section in his famous methodological article on Nietzsche.
(47) "I had reasons to look about me for scholarly, bold, and 
industrious comrades (I am still looking)." p.21.
(48) Note that this will be immediately denied in the first 
sections o f Essay One.
(49) It is this aspect o f genealogy that will be taken over by the 
Foucault o f the 1970s, and not the much more important section 6.
(50) But this necessarily includes the investigator himself, whose 
alone-ness is only a matter o f degree, and not a complete 
difference. This is the way the spirit o f Nietzsche can be used 
against some of his late words.
(51) Foucault's studies o f bio-power in 1975-76 are at once 
attempts to excavate this connection and show the extent to which 
Nietzsche himself was caught in it.
(52) This is an effect o f Freud. The aim o f Freud was to de- 
penalise sexuality, its inclinations; to eliminate the guilty feelings 
individuals had about themselves concerning wishes, desires, and 
dreams over which they did not have a conscious control. But the 
effects were broader than that. The idea that one has no control 
over his sexual desires and should not "repress" them promoted 
irresponsibility and the devaluing o f the possibility o f an ethical 
conduct o f life. The ambivalences o f this issue are well reflected 
by Marianne Weber's biography o f Max Weber, especially if read 




























































































(53) In revising these paragraphs, I was helped by the nearly 
completed dissertation project o f Veronica Munoz Dardé on 
fraternity'.
(54) The term "structure" is used here in the sense of Dumézil, 
and not Lévi-Strauss.
(55) See The Order o f Things. Perhaps one day the same thing 
will be said about Habermas and Foucault.
(56) One could again evoke Elias here - to talk about the 
brotherhood of mankind today in the West is like instructing 
adults about eating habits. The arrangement may not be perfect, 
but the working o f the idea is assumed.
(57) Perhaps this is the reason why Nietzsche calls them 
"genealogists", even if they use the term "moral philosophers".
(58) See the Birth o f Tragedy, p. 60: "Knowledge kills action; 
action requires the veils o f illusion: this is the doctrine o f Hamlet".
(59) See for e.g. the way the concept o f "natural rights" is at the 
center o f the controversy since the 17th century - as it has 
recently reemerged in debates in the history o f political thought.
(60) See Letter 32, 'On Progress', and also Letter 52, 'On chosing 
our teachers', in Seneca in ten volumes, vol. 4., Epistulae Morales 
(London, Heinemann, 1979).
(61) This concept, taken from Tertullian, was central for 
Foucault's 1980 lectures at the Collège de France. See also 
'Sexuality and Solitude', London Review o f Books, 21 May-3 June 
1981.
(62) Particular uncertainty remains with the dating o f Troilus and 
Cressida.
(63) See G. B. Harrison, Introducing Shakespeare (Penguin, 1966), 
pp. 164-5, and Germaine Greer, Shakespeare (Oxford Univ Press, 
1986).
(64) Since the 17th century', it is a recurrent idea o f Shakespeare 
scholarship that Shakespeare was a "natural" talent, without much 
erudition or consciousness about what he was doing. For a recent 
example, see Greer, p.5: "An essential aspect o f the mind and art 
o f Shakespeare ... is his lack o f self-consciousness". However, as 
the arguments o f this paper make it plan, such an idea does not 
even make sense, and is based on a fundamental misconception of 
his age, a period that was termed the age o f neo-stoicism (See 
Gerhard Oestreich. Neostoicism and the early modern state ; 
Cambridge University' Press, 1982). Shakespeare’s references to 
nature should not be taken as early examples o f romanticism. His 
views on nature owe much more to Seneca's idea o f natura : the 
external world obeys rational laws, and its knowledge can help us 
to behave rationally, by taking a proper care o f the self. About 





























































































(65) For a recent and most thought-provoking example, see Ted 
Hughes, Shakespeare and the Goddess o f Complete Being (London, 
Faber and Faber, 1992).
(66) For e.g. a recent study o f the play starts with the following 
statement: "Troilus and Cressida is Shakespeare's most puzzling 
work"; see Peter Hyland, Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida 
(London, Penguin, 1989), For overviews, see Priscilla Martin (ed), 
Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida (London, Macmillan, 1976), and 
Kenneth Palmer (ed), Troilus and Cressida (London, Methuen, 
1982). Another fact neglected so far is that this play has a Preface. 
Though it is generally doubted that it has been written by 
Shakespeare, this would be worth paying more attention.
(67) The claim is not that talent is not required, but that it is only 
a necessary, and not sufficient condition for creativity.
(68) The desire for peace was also a central element in the 
thoughts o f Christian humanists like More, Erasmus, or Vives, in 
the early 16th century. The difference is that for Shakespeare, 
Abbé St Pierre, and later Saint-Simon, it was not just a wish, but a 
definite vision o f the future.
(69) See the two main speeches by Ulysses (i.iii) and Hector (ii.ii), 
in the two major counsel scenes.
(70) See the famous discussion o f reason o f state by Ulysses 
(iii.iii), quoted for e.g. by Meinecke in his classic work on raison 
d'état ; see Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine o f 
Raison d'état and its Place in Modern History (London, Routledge, 
1957).
(71) For e.g., the speeech by Ulysses referred to above is 
introduced by the information Ulysses, as a representative o f the 
state, gathered about the private love affairs o f Achilles, to the 
great surprise o f the latter.
(72) For this, and most other facts about Weber's life, see 
Marianne Weber: Max Weber: A Biography (Oxford, Transaction 
Books, 1988 [1926]). I must also acknowledged the profound 
influence the work o f Wilhelm Hennis (see note 4) exerted on 
some o f these arguments.
(73) This analysis builds upon the on-going dissertation project of 
Monica Greco. For the main thesis, see 'Psychosomatic Subjects and 
the "Duty to Be Well": Personal agency within medical rationality', 
forthcoming in Economy and Society, 1993.
(74) See the Critique o f Stammler (N.Y. The Free Press, 1977 
[1906]), and Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems o f Historical 
Economics (N.Y. The Free Press, 1975 [1903-06]), both translated 
by Guy Oakes, who also provided them with useful introductions.
(75) Thus, in the Spring o f 1920, he said that ""1 am working the 
way I did thirty years ago, I have an abundance of ideas."" See 




























































































(76) Recently, much is made o f Foucault's homosexuality, used 
sometimes to explain the content and relevance o f his work. 
However, in my view, it only matters in enabling him to make a 
distance from what others took for granted, and has no impact on 
the content o f his ideas. Everything else belongs to the tragic story 
o f one o f the greatest thinkers (and perhaps even human beings) 
o f this century, who has never been able in his private life to get 
over the deprivations he suffered due to his repressed 
homosexuality in his youth. For recent and crucial biographical 
material, see Hervé Guibert, À l'ami qui ne m'a pas sauvé la vie 
(Paris, Gallimard, 1991), which is a novel, but the character 'Muzik 
is a faithful rendition of Foucault; Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault 
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard U.P., 1991); and James Miller, The 
Passion o f Michel Foucault (N.Y., Simon and Schuster, 1992). I 
have not yet been able to consult Miller. See also Alan Ryan, 
'Foucault's Life and Hard Times', The New York Review o f Books 
40 (1993), 7:12-17, a fair review o f the three books.
(77) Thus, for e.g., on the occasion, Georges Dumézil, who was 
abroad at that time, wrote several letters in support o f Foucault's 
candidature, stating that ""Attention, ne laissez pas passer le 
génie."" See Georges Dumézil, Entretiens avec Didier Eribon (Paris, 
Gallimard, 1987), p.217.
(78) Foucault spends 1967-69 with re-thinking his own method. 
The original aim is to make it clear for others. In fact, it leads to a 
questioning o f self. For an example o f his self-doubts, see 'Politics 
and the Study o f Discourse', in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, with two lectures by and an interview with 
Michel Foucault, ed. by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter 
Miller (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), which alludes to 
months spent in meditation on thequestion concerning the 
potential impact o f his work, related to the fearof being enclosed 
in the ivory tower o f pure intellectual games.
(79) This is contained in the second French edition o f Didier 
Eribon, Michel Foucault (Paris, Flammarion, 1991), and remained 
unpublished in English.
(80) See L'ordre du discours (Paris, Gallimard, 1971), pp. 7-8.
(81) Ibid., pp. 81-82.
(82) Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge, pp. 79-81.
(83) This has been left out o f the English edition, but is contained 
in Difendere la società (Firenze, Ponte alle Grazie, 1990), pp.19- 
20.
(84) See 'Un plaisir si simple'. Gai Pied no.l, April 1979.
(85) See, for e.g., two interviews in the collection edited by Colin 
Gordon: 'Truth and Power' (June 1976), and 'The History of 
Sexuality' (December 1976); an absolutely crucial interview given 




























































































misleading; (see 'Power and Sex', Telos no.32, Summer 1977, 
p.157, and for the original, 'Non au sexe roi', Le Nouvel 
Observateur no. 644, March 12, 1977, p.105); and the end o f the 
third lecture o f the 1978 course at the Collège de France, given in 
25 January.
(86) Paul Rabinow tells the story that when they first met, 
Foucault called them, with a smile, "mes assassins"; see 
'Recollection', in University Publishing, Summer 1984, p.16. Their 
intervention became instead, in a playful relation with the 
analytic o f finitude, a central concept of Foucault's The Order of 
Things, and the book of Dreyfus and Rabinow, a source o f life.
(87) See 'Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism o f 'Political 
Reason', in S. M. McMurrin (ed.) The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values (Salt Lake City: The University o f Utah Press, 1981). It 
should be pointed out that two other thinkers exerted a 
considerable influence on Foucault's 1980 course: Goffman, 
especially with The Presentation o f Self in Everyday Life : and 
Elias with The Court Society.
(88) This was published anonymously in France, as Maurice 
Florence, 'Foucault', in: Dictionnaire des philosophes (Paris, PUF, 
1984), and translated as "(Auto)biography', in History of the 
Present, 1988, no.4.
(89) See Hervé Guibert, 1991, pp. 24-25.
(90) See ibid., 26-27; also, until well into 1981, his only 
publications were two discussions where he remained anonymous, 
and a few other discussions and prefaces reflecting earlier 
obligations.
(91) See Hervé Guibert, 1991, pp. 37-38. Therefore, due to the 
central importance of the lectures Foucault gave at the Collège de 
France in his last period, all writings in the huge secondary 
literature that do not have some kind of first-hand knowledge of 
and in-depth work on the last Foucault are o f very limited value. 
For the few exceptions, see the works o f James Bernauer, Hubert 
Dreyfus, Colin Gordon, Paul Rabinow, and John Rajchman. For a 
path-breaking study that is only available in Spanish, but is being 
translated into French, see Maité Larrauri, 'Verdad y racionalidad 
en Michel Foucault', Ph. D. dissertation, University o f Valencia, 
1990.
(92) For some of the clearest statements, see the first lecture of 
1981, given in 6 January; 'The ethic o f care for the self as a 
practice o f freedom', in James Bernauer and David Rasmussen 
(eds), The Final Foucault (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1988), 
interview given in 20 January 1984; and 'The Return of Morality', 
in Kritzman (ed), 1988, interview given in 29 May, 1984, four 




























































































(93) An example is the 'Intended Preface to the History o f 
Sexuality', in Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader , used in the first 
lecture o f 1983.
(94) Due to its fundamental importance for understanding 
Foucault's work and his problem, and for methodological reasons 
concerning genealogy and the study of authors, a few sentences 
should be said on the trajectory o f Foucault's analysis of this text. 
From circumstantial evidence, based on the important interview 
given in March 1977 (see note 85), it can be shown that Kant's 
text produced a significant effect, represented an experience for 
Foucault in early 1977. He first analysed the text in April 1978, in 
front o f the same restricted audience of a philosophical association 
that first heard the 'What is Author' lecture in 1969, and in it, 
Foucault's first wish of anonymity'. (See Conférence inédite à la 
Société Française de Philosophie , Foucault Archives, D 212). In the 
following years, the text has been mentioned, but not analysed in 
detail, in a number of publications. See 'Preface' to Georges 
Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological (Boston, Riedel, 
1978); 'Postface', in Michelle Perrot (ed), L'impossible prison 
(Paris, Seuil,1980), written probably in 1978; 'Pour une morale de 
l'inconfort'; a review of a book by Jean Daniel, Le Nouvel 
Observateur no 754, 23 April 1979, pp.82-83; 'The Subject and 
Power', Afterword to Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, based on a 
lecture given in November 1981 at the USC; and 'Structuralism 
and Post-Structuralism', Telos no.55, Spring 1983, pp. 195-210, 
an interview given in May 1982. The first full-blown public 
presentation was in the first lecture o f 1983 at the Collège de 
France, on 5 January. The second hour of this lecture, in a re­
worked version, has been partially published as the first part o f 
the essay 'What Is Enlightenment?', in Rabinow (ed), The Foucault 
Reader, pp. 32-38. Most o f the transcript o f the first hour o f the 
lecture has been published in Foucault's life, in 31 May' 1984, 
translated as "Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution', Economy 
and Society 15 (1986), 1; 88-96. From the secondary' literature, 
for an excellent analysis, that, however, does not cover some of 
the material, see Colin Gordon, ’Question, ethos, event: Foucault on 
Kant and Enlightenment’, Economy and Society 15 (1986), 1: 71- 
87.
(95) The last two courses Foucault gave at the Collège de France, 
though are the most important, are the least known. This is partly 
due to the fact that Foucault failed to prepare even their outline, 
and are thus not included in the Résumé des courses. 1970-82 
(Paris, Juillard, 1989). For a carefully edited version o f the 
seminars Foucault gave on parrhesia in 1983 in Berkeley, see 
’Discourse and Truth: The Problématisation of Parrhesia', 




























































































For a much less careful edition of parts of some o f the 1983-84 
lectures, see Ulrike Reuter et al (eds), Das Wahrsprechen des 
Anderen (Frankfurt, Materialis Verlag, 1988).
(96) See Eribon, 1991, p.319; see also the conversations with 
Dreyfus and Rabinow, 19 and 26 April 1983, in Foucault Archives, 
D 250 (5) and (9).
(97) See Hervé Guibert, 1991, pp. 32-33.
(98) The source o f the idea about the instrumental use o f the 
thought o f mortality is the dissertation project o f Sebastian 
Rinken, entitled 'The self vis-à-vis death: does AIDS make a 
difference?'.
(99) As an indirect proof, whenever in the last interviews he was 
asked about sexuality, Foucault started his answer by stating how 
bored he became with the topic. This, usually but incorrectly, is 
assumed to hold only for the 1970's.
(100) For the clearest statement o f the importance Foucault 
attributed to the unpublished lectures, see 'The ethic o f care for 
the self as a practice o f freedom', in Bernauer and Rasmussen 
(eds), 1988, p.l.
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